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1.1  Introduction 
On March 27, 1987, President Ronald Reagan announced that prohibitive 
(100 percent) tariffs would be imposed on $300 million worth of imports from 
Japan. This unilateral retaliatory action-the  largest and the first such action 
against this U.S. ally in the postwar period-arose  from the Reagan adminis- 
tration’s determination that Japan had violated  a 1986 bilateral agreement on 
international trade in semiconductors. More than any single event, this action 
dramatized the seriousness with which the U.S. government viewed the semi- 
conductor agreement, which in turn reflected how important the government 
regarded the interests of U.S. semiconductor producers. 
Indeed, the very existence of  a semiconductor trade agreement was testi- 
mony to the U.S. industry’s success in getting the  government to act on its 
behalf  in its  dispute with  Japan. Few industries ever receive  the  sustained, 
high-level  attention  needed  to  result  in the  negotiation  of  a  governmental 
agreement on trade in just one sector. Such a sectoral agreement is attractive 
from the perspective  of virtually  any import-competing  industry because  it 
virtually guarantees the institutionalization of trade policy for that industry. In 
the case of semiconductors, getting such special treatment in tbe first place 
was more difficult than perpetuating it: once the agreement was on paper, the 
policy debate within the U.S. government was essentially  over. The govem- 
ment,  including  those  agencies  that  may  have  originally  opposed  the 
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agreement,  then had a direct stake in its enforcement,  lest the credibility of 
such foreign commitments be undermined. Once the agreement was in place, 
it required monitoring and at some point renewal or renegotiation. This pro- 
vided  a natural rationale for ongoing contacts between  the industry and the 
government, providing the industry with easy access to key policymakers and 
allowing close industry-government ties to develop. 
The semiconductor industry’s success on these dimensions did not prevent 
the 1986 accord with Japan from arguably representing the most controversial 
U.S. trade policy action of that decade. In this agreement, the government of 
Japan agreed to end the “dumping” of semiconductors in the United States and 
in other markets and to help secure 20 percent of the Japanese semiconductor 
market for foreign producers within five years. The antidumping provisions- 
resulting in part from the extraordinary self-initiation of an antidumping action 
by the U.S. government against Japan-later  proved to be in partial violation 
of the General Agreement  of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and drew the ire of 
prominent high-technology semiconductor-using industries, particularly com- 
puter systems manufacturers. Computer producers formed a countervailing in- 
terest  group to oppose these  provisions  and eventually  forced them  to  be 
dropped in the 1991 renegotiation of the agreement. 
The 20  percent  market share provision-an  exceptional request  from the 
standpoint  of  traditional  U.S.  trade policy-was  the  negotiated  solution  to 
the problem of market access in Japan based on circumstantial evidence that 
the market  was closed to foreign  semiconductor  producers.’ This provision 
proved  successful in that foreign  producers  achieved a 20.2 percent  market 
share in Japan in the fourth quarter of 1992, although the share fluctuated sub- 
sequently. But by  concentrating  on specific, quantitative “results” and “out- 
comes”  rather  than  the principle  of  market  access,  the  provision  provoked 
sharp debate: it was either heralded as a positive, concrete step toward gaining 
greater sales in Japan (“making the cash registers ring,” as it was commonly 
put) or scorned as a step toward cartelized “managed trade” and export protec- 
tionism via government-fixed market shares. Despite this controversy, the pro- 
vision has survived as a part of U.S. trade policy toward semiconductors, hav- 
ing  been  supported  and  perpetuated  by  three  different  U.S.  trade 
representatives  (USTRs-Clayton  Yeutter, Carla Hills, and Mickey  Kantor) 
serving under three different presidential administrations, the most recent of 
which promised to expand the concept of import targets with Japan to other 
sectors. (See table 1.1 for a chronology of the trade dispute.) 
This chapter examines how  the U.S.  semiconductor  industry  became  the 
beneficiary  of  this unprecedented  sectoral trade agreement by analyzing the 
I. The theory  of  commercial policy  now  includes this new  instrument of  trade policy  in  its 
analysis: Jagdish Bhagwati has dubbed such market share targets as “voluntary import expansions” 
(VIES),  the import counterpart to voluntary export restraints (VERs). See the analysis and critique 
of  import targets in Irwin (1994). 13  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
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political and economic forces leading up to the 1986 accord and shaping subse- 
quent events. The primary purpose is to understand how various groups-firms 
in the U.S. semiconductor industry, agencies within the U.S. government, and 
domestic semiconductor-using industries-interacted  in the political realm in 
the  determination of  policy. To  this  end, I shall address how the economic 
structure of  the  industry and the legal framework of  U.S. trade institutions 
shaped the opportunities of and the constraints on the industry and policymak- 
ers, and hence helped determine the observed outcomes. Particular attention 
will be devoted to how the political process functioned in the semiconductor 
case, with its unusual amalgamation of antidumping and market-opening ac- 
tions which have been both celebrated and vilified. Furthermore, much of the 
interesting politics and negotiations behind U.S. semiconductor trade policy 
was not between the industry and the government  as monolithic actors, but 
between  factions  within the  industry  and  within the  government.  Although 
such maneuverings are often hidden  from the public record, I shall attempt 
to shed some light on the consensus-building process within the industry and 
the government  that ultimately  led to the  1986 agreement  and the willing- 
ness of the Reagan administration to impose high tariffs against a large foreign 
ally. 14  Douglas A. Irwin 
1.2  Organization of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
Semiconductors are a key microelectronic component used in a multitude of 
goods ranging from televisions and microwave ovens, aircraft and automobiles, 
computers and calculators, to telephones and watches. The origins of the semi- 
conductor industry date from 1947 when Bell Labs developed the first transis- 
tor and from 1959 with the invention of  the integrated circuit. Integrated cir- 
cuits, in which increasing numbers (at first hundreds, then thousands, and now 
millions) of transistors are etched onto a thin wafer of silicon, quickly became 
the building block of the industry. Propelled by the demands for such circuits 
by the military  and space programs, which generated sizeable revenues to be 
plowed  back  into research  and development  (R&D) expenditures,  the  U.S. 
semiconductor industry grew rapidly in the 1960s. Rapid growth and techno- 
logical change continued in the 1970s and 1980s with the proliferation of com- 
mercial applications for semiconductors, particularly in computers, telecom- 
munications, and consumer electronics.2 
The rapid growth experienced by the U.S. industry is illustrated in table 1.2, 
which indicates that the nominal value of  shipments grew at a 15.7 percent 
average  annual  rate  from  1975 to  1991, an  average  that  masks  negligible 
growth in  1981-82  and 1989-90  and a 17.5 percent contraction in 1984-86.' 
By contrast, overall industrial production in manufacturing increased only by 
an  average 4.5 percent annually  over the  same period.  Competition  among 
semiconductor producers is marked by rapid technological change and contin- 
ual product innovation driven by the devotion of substantial resources to R&D. 
In  1989, for example, the U.S. electronic components industry spent 8.3 per- 
cent of net sales on R&D, compared with 3.1 percent for U.S. industry 0veral1.~ 
These R&D investment expenditures reflect firms anticipating production  in 
the next generation  of  semiconductors  and result in relatively  short product 
life cycles. 
Semiconductors are often divided into three broad product categories, dis- 
crete devices (basic transistors), optoelectronic devices (light-sensitive chips), 
and-by  far the largest category-integrated  circuits. Integrated circuits ac- 
counted for over 80 percent of U.S. semiconductor consumption in 1985 and 
include several different types of products, including logic chips (for arithme- 
tic and decision-making  functions),  microprocessors  (the central processing 
2. As demand shifted away from military applications toward new consumer electronics (often 
produced outside of  the United States), foreign firms began to enter the market and the position 
of US.  semiconductor producers began to erode gradually in the  1970s. Military demands ac- 
counted for roughly half of  US. semiconductor shipments in the early 1960s but dropped to 10 
percent by  198  1. 
3. The undeflated average growth rate severely understates real output growth because semicon- 
ductor prices have experienced secular declines. See fig. 1.1. 
4. Electronic components (SIC 367) is a broader industry aggregate than semiconductors (SIC 
3674). When federal funds are included, the industry spent 9.3 percent of  net  sales (National 
Science Foundation, Research and Devekpnenr  in  Industry,  1989, NSF 92-307  [Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19921, Detailed Tables, 77). 15  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
Table 1.2  Selected Economic Indicators of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
Value of  Payroll per  New Capital 
Shipments  Total  Production  Employee  Expenditures  Exports  Imports 









































































































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Manufacturers (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various years). 
Note; Data are for SIC code 3674, semiconductors and related devices. Export and import figures are 
from unpublished census data on U.S. trade by  SIC code. They are affected, however, by the off-shore 
assembly provisions of the US  tariff code and by the substantial trade in components. 
unit in computers), and various application-specific integrated circuits (con- 
figured for particular user needs). Even within these categories semiconductors 
perform quite different functions and are generally imperfect substitutes for 
one another, with specific devices often filling small market niches. Amid this 
product variety, technological progress tends to be incremental, and specific 
product generations are not clearly defined. 
Much of the intense international competition and consequent trade dispute 
in the 1980s, however, centered on a unique set of digital integrated circuits- 
memory chips-which  are primarily used in computers to store and retrieve 
data in various forms5 Memory chips accounted for 18 percent of  all U.S. 
semiconductor purchases in 1985. DRAMs, the largest volume of all semicon- 
ductor products, constituted 7 percent of the total market and EPROMs another 
3 percent (see Federal Interagency Staff Working Group 1987, 5). Within the 
several categories of memory chips, the market approximates perfect competi- 
5. Random-access memories (RAMs) temporarily store data or information; dynamic random- 
access memories (DRAMs) are designed to store large amounts of  data, while static random- 
access memories (SRAMs) are faster but hold less information. Read-only memories (ROMs) 
store data more permanently than RAMs; erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROMs) 
allow data programs to be easily erased and reprogrammed. 16  Douglas A. Irwin 
tion: DRAMs, for instance, are a standardized product and are almost perfectly 
interchangeable regardless of which firm produces them. In addition to product 
homogeneity, DRAMs are marked by  well-defined  generations that give rise 
to distinct product cycles. In 1970,  the 1K RAM chip (capable of storing 1,024 
bits of information) was introduced. This was followed by the 4K chip in 1973, 
16K in 1976,64K in  1979,256K in 1982, 1M in 1985,4M in 1989, and 16M 
in 1991.  A key industry transition occurs when the cost per bit becomes equiva- 
lent for adjacent generations of chips. For example, in 1978 price per bit equiv- 
alency was achieved between 4K and  16K chips, accelerating the demise of 
4K demand, and hence the value of investments specific to the production of 
4K chips, and the assent of 16K demand. Firms unprepared for such transitions 
could see their sales evaporate in the space of months. 
Such rapid product cycles imply that firms have a relatively short period in 
which to earn sufficient profits to recover their generation-specific R&D and 
capital investments. The riskiness of having a relatively short horizon in which 
to recover the earlier R&D and up-front capital expenditures is compounded 
by  low marginal  costs of production  (the actual material and labor costs of 
manufacturing semiconductors are quite small), which leads to the temptation 
during periods of weak  demand to undercut the price  of  rivals and thereby 
undermine  industry  profitability. Both the  large  fixed costs  (in the form of 
R&D and capital expenditures) and learning by doing imply that only a few 
firms can survive in the memory chip segment of the industry.h Continuous 
innovations in high technologies offset this tendency and allow small start-up 
or spin-off firms to enter the semiconductor market and possibly  experience 
rapid growth (though the failure rate is high). 
These distinctive aspects of the semiconductor industry give most firms an 
interest in obtaining certain government policies to reduce risks in the sector: 
more favorable tax treatment for R&D, relaxed antitrust restrictions on joint 
research ventures, greater patent protection for chip designs and innovations, 
and so forth. These common interests were behind the formation of an industry 
association in 1977. Perhaps the strongest impetus for an industry group, how- 
ever, arose from the  entry of  Japanese  semiconductor producers in the late 
1970s. This new competition shocked the U.S. industry and provided a com- 
mon external threat that motivated the start of concerted political action. Be- 
fore discussing Japanese competition in more detail in the next section, some 
additional economic  features of  the  U.S.  semiconductor  industry  that  bear 
upon its entry into the political market require analysis. 
In The Logic of  Collective Action (197 l), Mancur Olson pointed to eco- 
nomic size and concentration (both geographic and economic) as key determi- 
6. Firm-specific learning by doing, wherein past production experience provides valuable infor- 
mation that allows firms to reduce their cost of production, generates dynamic economies of scale 
in that firms that have large (cumulative) output should have cost advantages over other producers. 
For  a recent  evaluation of  learning  by  doing  in  the  semiconductor  industry. see  Irwin  and 
Klenow ( 1994). 17  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
nants of whether firms could  succcssfully organize for cooperative political 
action. Even though current U.S. trade laws enable individual firms to seek 
import relief even in the absence of industry collective action, these factors 
remain influential in the political market and are worth describing in the con- 
text of the semiconductor industry. In  1989, the value of U.S. semiconductor 
industry shipments was $25.7 billion and total U.S.  employment was 184,000 
(roughly 1.3  percent of total manufacturing employment). Compared with the 
two manufacturing sectors most notable in receiving U.S. trade protection- 
the textile and apparel industry with shipments of $130 billion and employ- 
ment of  1,671,000, and the motor vehicle industry with shipments of $149 
billion and direct employment of 250,000-semiconductors  may seem small. 
Yet  the  steel  industry-with  shipments of  $63 billion  and  employment of 
256,000-is  only twice as large as the semiconductor industry, which is cer- 
tainly larger than, say, the shipbuilding industry (with $9.6 billion in shipments 
and employment of 119,000).’  While the semiconductor industry is a relatively 
small part of the economy as a whole, it is not (unlike the products it produces) 
minuscule  by  standard measures. Furthermore,  the industry has  often been 
thought to take on an economic importance larger than such numbers would 
indicate, owing to its “strategic” position in the high-technology sector with 
“critical” downstream linkages to the computer and defense industries (to bor- 
row the rhetoric of such industry groups as the National Advisory Committee 
on Semiconductors). 
What the industry lacks in sheer economic size is compensated by a fair 
degree of  concentration in a few parts of the United States. According to the 
1987 Census of Manufactures, about a third of  U.S.  semiconductor employ- 
ment was located in California, with Arizona, Texas, and New York accounting 
for another third. Particularly because of its concentration in “Silicon Valley,” 
part of northern California around San Jose, the industry has been able to cap- 
ture the attention and services of California’s congressional representatives. 
During the  1980s, Republican Senator Pete Wilson and Democratic Senator 
Alan Cranston both strongly championed the cause of U.S. industry, sponsor- 
ing congressional actions to assist the industry and to pressure the executive 
branch to act upon the interests of the industry. 
Geographic concentration is matched by some degree of economic concen- 
tration. Firms in the industry range from the enormous-such  as International 
Business Machines (IBM), by far the largest semiconductor producer in the 
world in the mid- 1980s-to  the minuscule-such  as tiny Micron Technology, 
which  specialized exclusively in  DRAMS. In  1989, IBM  employed  about 
383,000 people and had $41,586 million in revenues, generating net income 
of  $3,758 million (9.0 percent  of  revenue). An unknown fraction of its re- 
7. These figures are taken from U.S. Department of Commerce U.S.  Industrial Outlook, 1992 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992). The data are for semiconductors and re- 
lated devices (SIC 3674), textile mill (SIC 22) and apparel and other textile products (SIC 23), 
motor vehicles and car bodies (SIC 3711), and steel mill products (SIC 3312, -15, -16, -17). 18  Douglas A. Irwin 
sources are devoted to semiconductors, but IBM was reputed to have semicon- 
ductor output nearly 25 percent greater than the next largest competitor, Nip- 
pon Electric Corporation (NEC), in the mid-1980s. By contrast, Micron had 
3,000 employees in 1989 with a net income of $106 million on sales of $446 
million (23.8 percent of  revenue).8 Despite this gross mismatch in  terms of 
overall size (Micron’s sales were only two-tenths of  1 percent of IBM’s), both 
firms proved  equally pivotal  in determining U.S.  trade  policy  in  semicon- 
ductors. 
Between these extremes lie a handful of prominent midsized firms that con- 
stitute the core of the US.  semiconductor industry. Five key firms (1989 data) 
are Texas Instruments (TI), with 70,000 employees and a net income of $291.7 
million on revenues of  $6,521.9 million (4.5 percent of  revenue); Motorola, 
with  104,000 employees and a net  income of  $498 million on net sales of 
$9,620 million (5.2 percent); Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) with  13,072 
employees and a net income of $46.1 million on sales of $1,604.6 million (2.9 
percent); National Semiconductor with 32,200 employees and suffering a net 
loss of $23.2 million on net sales of $1,647.9 million (- 1.4 percent); and Intel 
with 22,000 employees and a net income of $391  .0  million on sales of $3,126.8 
million (12.5 percent). The 1991 market share rankings of these firms in the 
North American  semiconductor  market (including captive production)  were 
9.8 percent for Intel, 9.3 percent for Motorola, 5.1 percent  for TI, and 3.8 
percent for National Semicondu~tor.~ 
The political economy of the industry’s trade policy efforts, however, hinges 
more on  structural features of  these  firms-particularly  the  distinction  be- 
tween captive and merchant firms-than  on firm size or profitability. Captive 
producers-such  as  IBM,  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  (AT&T), 
Hewlett-Packard, and Control Data-are  vertically integrated and manufac- 
ture semiconductors mainly for internal consumption, that is, for use in down- 
stream goods and services that they produce and sell themselves. These firms 
rarely, if ever, supply their semiconductors to other producers.I0 Primarily be- 
cause of IBM’s position as the world’s largest semiconductor producer, captives 
account for a substantial share of U.S. output, but they may have little impact 
on  semiconductor prices  and trade because most of  their transactions  take 
place within the firm.” Yet captives are generally unable to produce the entire 
range of semiconductors for their own use, and they are often large purchasers 
8. These 1989 data, as well as those in the next paragraph, are taken from MoodyS Industrial 
9. U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC 1993b, 7). 
10. After deregulation, AT&T briefly sold DRAMs on the open market. IBM reportedly feared 
the antitrust implications of entering the DRAM market, as well as the awkward position of sup- 
plying a key input to its competitors in the computer market. In 1992, however, IBM began selling 
its DRAMs on the merchant market. 
11. Captives accounted for 15.8 percent of the North American semiconductor market in 1991, 
11.2 percentage points of which was IBM (USITC 1993b, 7). 
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of semiconductors, particularly IBM, which is frequently a major consumer to 
the industry as a whole. 
Merchant firms, by contrast, produce semiconductors for sale to other firms. 
Motorola is the largest U.S. merchant firm that, along with TI, is diversified 
and  produces  semiconductors  for  its  own  products-telecommunications 
equipment in the case of Motorola, calculators and defense electronics in the 
case of TI. Motorola and TI also have production facilities in Japan and export 
to the United States. Other firms, including Intel, AMD, National Semiconduc- 
tor, and Micron, are smaller, less diversified, and more purely merchants in 
that all production is sold to other semiconductor-using firms. These compa- 
nies also differ in size and in the range of products they produce. 
The divide among firms as captives  or merchants plays a key  role in the 
political economy of the industry. Merchant firms potentially reap a substantial 
gain from diminishing  import competition  and  maintaining  high prices  for 
semiconductors; captive producers are likely to be net purchasers of semicon- 
ductors and desire low input prices. These sharply diverging and conflicting 
interests within the industry have plagued its efforts at unified political action, 
and each group has had to make partial accommodation with the other in the 
collective industry association. 
The international nature of  semiconductor production  also influences  the 
types of trade policies the industry has sought. In an effort to reduce costs, the 
US. semiconductor industry by the early 1970s began to move labor-intensive 
assembly operations overseas, particularly to Southeast Asia. Off-shore assem- 
bly was encouraged by sections of the US. tariff code under which only for- 
eign value added is taxed upon the reimportation of designated goods. It may 
not be uncommon,  for example, for a semiconductor to be designed in the 
United States, fabricated in Japan, assembled in Malaysia, and distributed for 
sale in Europe. Unlike industries traditionally seeking protection against im- 
port competition, that is, domestic producers whose assets are generally fixed 
in the United States (such as textiles  and steel) and whose rivals are based 
abroad and export to the United States, the international character of semicon- 
ductor production and assembly implies that import protection via nondiscrim- 
inatory tariffs or quotas are not desirable to the industry since many U.S. firms 
are the importers. In fact, as will be discussed below, the U.S. industry (i.e., 
management)  spearheaded  a  successful effort  to  eliminate  most  tariffs  on 
semiconductor products in both the United States and Japan in 1985. The fun- 
damental challenge facing U.S. firms was not excessive imports to be remedied 
through higher tariffs, but competition from non-US. producers regardless of 
the location of their production. 
While industry concentration and location relate to the costs and benefits of 
collectively  organizing for political  activity, the theory of  international trade 
points to the economic interests of various factors of production, such as labor 
and capital owners, in shaping the configuration of trade policy lobbying. As 20  Douglas A. Irwin 
Mussa (1974) and others describe, these economic interests depend on the in- 
tensity with which the factors are used in a given sector of production and their 
specificity to that sector. Economic theory suggests that the more specific and 
immobile are labor and capital in a given sector of employment, the more their 
fate is tied to the fortunes of that sector and the more likely they are to seek 
policies favoring that sector. 
Unlike  many  import-competing  sectors in which organized  labor plays a 
major role in the  industry’s political  action, semiconductor workers  did not 
directly participate in the quest for government relief from Japanese competi- 
tion. That average weekly  wages in the semiconductor industry, which aver- 
aged $614 in 1987, were roughly 24 percent above the average for manufactur- 
ing overall  might  suggest  that  labor  should be concerned  that  an  industry 
contraction would place this premium in jeopardy.’?  Yet  the apparent lack of 
political activism among semiconductor workers can be explained by evidence 
that many of them have skills useful in various related industries, thereby en- 
suring their mobility across the high-technology  sector. Ong and Mar (1992) 
calculated how a sample of semiconductor workers laid off in 1985-a  year in 
which half the workforce was furloughed (either temporarily or permanently) 
and industry employment in northern California fell by 14 percent-were  far- 
ing two years later based on data from California’s unemployment insurance 
program. They found that workers reemployed by other semiconductor or high- 
technology  firms earned comparable wages to those rehired by their original 
semiconductor employer, suggesting the presence of sector-specific rather than 
industry- or firm-specific human ~apita1.l~  If such labor is mobile across the 
high-technology sector, workers do not have a particularly  strong stake in the 
fate of semiconductor firms per se as long as other high-technology sectors are 
performing well. That labor was largely silent in the semiconductor trade dis- 
pute does not mean that its interests were neglected by politicians: labor’s polit- 
ical action  committee  (the International Brotherhood  of  Electronic Workers 
[IBEW] Committee on Political Education) channeled $1.6 million to political 
candidates in 1985-86  and over $2.2 million in 1987-88, according to the Fed- 
eral Election Commission.’4 
Thus, in the many congressional hearings held on policy toward the semi- 
conductor industry in the 1980s, testimony was taken almost exclusively from 
corporate  executives  and  industry  officials,  not  labor  representatives.  The 
stance of management, the principal capital owners in the industry (merchant 
firms were not uncommonly still controlled by their founders), hinged primar- 
12. US.  Department of  Labor, Employment and Wages,  Annual Averages  for  1987 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988).  These figures are unadjusted for skill differences. 
13. In their sample, 57 percent of  workers were rehired,  16 percent became reemployed in 
other semiconductor or high-technology firms, and 27 percent found employment in other sectors. 
Workers reemployed in non-high-technology  sectors, however, suffered earnings losses of 27-36 
percent relative to rehired workers. 
14. This does not include contributions by  several IBEW local union political action commit- 
tees (PACs). 21  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
ily on whether the firm was a merchant or captive producer of semiconductors. 
Captive producers, most importantly IBM, were cautious about initiating any 
trade dispute with Japan. Not only did IBM’s substantial investments in Japan 
provide a rationale to avoid trade friction, but as a net purchaser of  semicon- 
ductors it had little interest in policies that might result in higher semiconduc- 
tor prices. TI was similarly cautious about acting against Japan: with a long- 
standing direct investment stake in Japan (it was the first U.S. firm to produce 
semiconductors in Japan), TI did not wish to jeopardize its economic or politi- 
cal ties there, nor would it welcome trade restraints that might prevent it from 
importing into the United States production from its Japanese facilities. 
Executives from merchant producers were the most vociferous proponents 
of  policies that would diminish Japanese competition and raise the price of 
their output. Politically active Motorola often took an aggressive stance against 
its Japanese rivals, filing antidumping complaints against Japanese exports of 
pagers and cellular phones during the 1980s, for example. Micron, which was 
not  well  diversified  and  only produced  chips for sale on the  open market, 
strongly supported import protection against Japanese competition and pushed 
for decisive actions against the “dumping” of  semiconductors in the United 
States. Larger merchant firms such as Intel, AMD, and National Semiconduc- 
tor were also concerned about competition from Japan and wanted intellectual 
property protection to prevent foreign firms from copying chip designs. 
In 1977, several merchant producers banded together to form the Semicon- 
ductor Industry Association (SIA) to promote common  interest^.'^ The SIA 
was founded by five industry leaders (all but one were either chairmen or chief 
executive officers)-W.  Jerry Sanders I11 (AMD), Robert Noyce (Intel), Wil- 
fred J. Corrigan (Fairchild), Charles Sporck (National Semiconductor), and 
John Welty (Motorola). Each of these firms competed fiercely with one another 
on certain dimensions-suing  each other over alleged patent violations, for 
example, or even conducting espionage against one another-but  they could 
agree on several common policy objectives, such as obtaining greater patent 
protection for chip designs, improving the tax treatment of R&D investment, 
and heightening political awareness of the emerging Japanese competition. 
Despite entering the policy arena as political novices, the SIA did not find a 
particularly hostile audience in Washington for any of these objectives, espe- 
cially in Congress. But because the few firms that the SIA comprised lacked 
the stature needed to give the organization visibility  and political  weight in 
Washington, specific accomplishments in the form of legislation or policy ac- 
tion  were initially  absent. To  redress this weakness, the  SIA broadened  its 
membership in  1982 to include vertically integrated captive producers, such 
as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), and AT&T. 
Beyond adding to the political standing of the SIA, this move had a more im- 
portant impact on its lobbying activities. The inclusion of the captive producers 
15. See Mundo (1992) for a general discussion of  the SINS  organization and objectives 22  Douglas A. Irwin 
exerted a moderating influence on the SIA trade policy stance because it forced 
the  merchants to consult with the  captives  in order to arrive at an industry 
consensus on policy positions.lh Four large merchant producers also formed 
PACs with which to provide campaign contributions to national political candi- 
dates. The disbursements of these PACs appear to be related to the trade dis- 
pute with Japan: payments totaled $354,3 18 at the peak of the dispute in 1985- 
86, 40 percent higher than in 1983-84  and 17 percent higher than in 1987-88 
after trade tensions had simmered down.” 
Several characteristics distinguish the SIA from most other industry interest 
groups. The industry  association  remains  an extremely  small institution:  in 
1992, the entire SIA staff consisted of just 13 people, seven professionals and 
six office personnel. The firms that the SIA comprises sought to prevent the 
organization  from  becoming  a  large,  independent,  staff-driven  entity  that 
would pursue objectives  increasingly divorced from the industry  that it was 
intended to represent.  The SIA’s  primary  function is to provide  a forum for 
industry leaders to reach a consensus on issues of joint concern and to oversee 
any political  action based on whatever consensus emerged. The main forum 
for determining the industry’s views on trade policy is the SINS  Public Policy 
Committee, consisting of  representatives from several (but not  all) member 
 firm^.'^ In carrying out that consensus, the SIA coordinates the industry’s polit- 
ical strategy but must (by virtue of its size) rely heavily on the work done by 
individual companies. Thus, it is the individual companies that constitute the 
SIA that are mainly engaged in political action, rather than the association as 
an independent entity. The SIA staff rarely  testify before Congress, for ex- 
ample, but work with member companies to enlist or designate the upper man- 
agement of a given firm to testify on behalf of the association. 
The SIA was also deliberately located in San Jose, California, not in Wash- 
ington, D.C., to ensure close contact with industry. However, many members 
of  the SIA-such  as Motorola, IBM, TI, and Intel, for example-maintain 
their  own  Washington  offices  to  monitor  policy  developments  of  interest. 
These offices primarily support the political  activities  of  the firms, but they 
also work on SIA initiatives. Consequently, there was little need for the SIA to 
maintain an office in Washington, because the work of the industry association 
fell heavily on member firms that already had offices there. The SIA had an 
additional resource in Washington: the services of the law firm Dewey Ballan- 
tine. By subcontracting part of its policy activity to Dewey Ballantine, the SIA 
avoided the overhead costs of maintaining staff in Washington, as well as gain- 
16. By 1992, the SIA had 32 regular members, although not all are equally politically active. 
17. These data are from the Federal Election Commission. The semiconductor PACs include 
the National Semiconductor Corporation Employees PAC, the Intel PAC, the Motorola Employees 
Good Government Committee, and the Constructive Citizenship Committee of Texas Instruments. 
Many of the contributions went to California congressmen. 
18. The SIA has other committees  on, for example, industry statistics, occupational health, 
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ing the counsel of politically astute Washington insiders, including the well- 
connected trade lawyer Alan Wolff. Such contracting reduced the start-up costs 
of political action, and the SIA reportedly spent only about $1 million per year 
on Washington activities during the mid- 1980s. 
Yoffe (1988) points to other factors of the SIA's  organization and strategy 
that allowed it to advance its political agenda in Washington successfully after 
1982. In contrast to many large industry associations in which the primary 
workload falls to the staff level, the lobbying activity by  the semiconductor 
industry was distinguished by a high degree of personal involvement by chief 
executive officers and upper management. Robert Noyce, a co-inventor of  the 
integrated circuit and chairman at Intel, reportedly spent 20 percent of his time 
in Washington  during  the  early  1980s. Such high-level  involvement com- 
manded respect among politicians and gave semiconductor producers access 
to policymakers at higher levels of government than the ordinary staff of any 
industry association could normally achieve. Extensive internal debates within 
the SIA before seeking specific policy actions allowed a consensus to emerge 
among members on a common approach to a given issue of collective interest. 
This consensus added to the credibility of the industry association, which tar- 
geted its efforts at friendly institutions within the government (often Capitol 
Hill, the Commerce Department, and the Office of the USTR). 
Producer interests seeking protectionist policies sometimes face the coun- 
tervailing force of downstream users of that particular good. For a period of 
time, the SIA did not face or was able to defuse potential opposition to its 
proposals. Computer manufacturers are the most important domestic users of 
memory chips, and it is precisely from this group that one would expect poten- 
tial opposition to proposals that would raise semiconductor prices. Semicon- 
ductors constituted 6.4 percent of the value of output in the electronic comput- 
ing equipment industry in  1982, a share that rose to 15.0 percent in 1986.19 
With shipments of  $59.8 billion and total employment of  263,000 in  1989, 
the computer industry (narrowly construed) was also slightly larger than the 
semiconductor industry.20  Semiconductors also constituted 6.7 percent of the 
value of output in the telephone and telegraph equipment industry, 8.3 percent 
in the radio and television communications equipment industry, and 5.0 per- 
cent in the home entertainment equipment industry in 1986. These semicon- 
ductor consumers were broadly organized in the American Electronics Associ- 
ation (AEA), a large group that included many SIA members and one that 
supported the SIA's  complaint about the lack of market access in Japan. With 
the rise in DRAM prices subsequent to the 1986 agreement, the AEA proved 
too unwieldy and diverse to organize opposition to the accord, and computer 
19. Calculated from input-output tapes of the US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco- 
20. From U.S. Department of Commerce, CIS. Industrial  Outlook, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: 
nomic Analysis. 
Government Printing Office, 1992), for computers and peripherals (SIC 3571, -2, -5, -7). 24  Douglas A. Irwin 
manufacturers formed a splinter group to counter the SIRS influence on U.S. 
semiconductor trade policy. 
Individual Japanese producers, their industry association (the EIAJ-Elec- 
tronics Industry Association of Japan), and the government of Japan were the 
only other major groups engaged in political action during the semiconductor 
trade dispute. Japanese firms hired legal counsel in the United States to defend 
them at various administrative hearings (related to both the antidumping and 
section 301 actions) and hired specialists in public relations and policy moni- 
toring. According to the Department of Justice, all Japanese firms and the EIAJ 
spent $3.8 million in 1985-87 on semiconductor trade-related political action, 
the bulk of this expense in 1986. Roughly $1.1 million over these three years 
was devoted, mainly by  the EIAJ, to countering the section 301 action. This 
suggests that lobbying expenditures by the SIA and Japanese producers were 
roughly comparable on this particular issue.2’ 
1.3  Semiconductor Competition from Japan 
Japan’s emergence as a major producer of semiconductors beginning in the 
late 1970s manifested itself in a dramatic increase in its share of  the world 
semiconductor market. At the end of the 1970s, U.S. firms accounted for over 
60 percent of the world market and Japanese firms less than 30 percent; by 
mid-1985, the market shares of the two countries were about equal at 45 per- 
cent, after which time the Japanese took the lead. This success was most spec- 
tacular in the DRAM market, arguably the natural class of  semiconductors in 
which  a  Japanese  entrant  could  achieve  dominance  given  the  relatively 
straightforward design technology and high degree of quality control required 
in  large-volume  DRAM production.  In  the  worldwide DRAM market,  the 
United States and Japan traded places: the U.S. share plummeted from 70 per- 
cent in 1978 to 20 percent  in  1986, while the Japanese  share jumped from 
under 30 percent to peak at 75 percent in that same period.** 
The rapid expansion of Japanese production did not vastly increase Japan’s 
import penetration in the United States. Figures in Tyson (1992, 129) indicate 
that Japan’s share of total U.S. semiconductor consumption rose from 7.5 per- 
2 1. Office of the Attorney General, Administration of  Foreign Agents Registration Act (Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  various issues). I am indebted to Steve Husted for providing these data to me. Yoffe 
(1988, 89) cites no source for the claim that Japanese firms spent $30-$50  million opposing the 
trade petitions of SIA members in the mid-1980s. The $1 million annual figure of SIA does not 
include the costs borne by private firms in their Washington lobbying effort, particularly in pursu- 
ing separate antidumping actions, nor PAC contributions. The figure for Japanese firms is also 
inflated partly due to the redundancy of a half-dozen or so Japanese firms seeking separate legal 
counsel in the United States (owing to potential conflicts of interests among the attorneys) rather 
than coordinating their activities as a group like U.S. firms. 
22. After making initial inroads in the 16K DRAM market, Japanese producers shocked U.S. 
producers with the rapid introduction of the 64K chip in 1978. Japanese firms accounted for about 
two-thirds of the 64K DRAM market from  1979 to  1986 and achieved over 80 percent of  the 
smaller but burgeoning market for 256K DRAMS from 1982 to 1986. See Tyson (1992, 106ff.). 25  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
cent in 1982 to 12.3 percent in 1984, before dropping back to 9.8 percent in 
1986. The U.S. share of the Japanese semiconductor market exceeded Japan’s 
share of the U.S. market until the mid-1980s and was roughly comparable for 
a few years thereafter. But 70 percent of  Japanese semiconductor exports to 
the United States were DRAMs, where they accounted for about 20 percent of 
the U.S. DRAM market in the mid-1980s. Japan’s share of the U.S. market was 
not fully indicative of the force of the new competition in DRAMs because, in 
an integrated  world market, Japanese producers  could only capture  market 
share abroad by forcing the market price downward everywhere. 
The rise of Japan’s semiconductor industry was driven by the rapid expan- 
sion in demand for transistors from the domestic consumer electronics indus- 
try. The different basis for the growth of the American and Japanese semicon- 
ductor industries reflected the considerable differences in end-use demand for 
semiconductors in the two markets: in Japan, consumer electronics provided 
47 percent  of  semiconductor demand  (the comparable figure in the United 
States being 8 percent), while data processing constituted 44 percent of U.S. 
demand in 1984. The different structure of final demand also led to a different 
way of  meeting that demand in Japan. Whereas the U.S. industry was com- 
posed primarily of independent merchant producers of modest size, the major 
Japanese semiconductor producers were also the major semiconductor con- 
sumers (i.e., the electronics firms). According to Okimoto (1987, 394), the 10 
largest firms accounting for 80 percent of  Japan’s semiconductor production 
also accounted for 50 percent of Japan’s total consumption. A few large, quasi- 
vertically integrated producers-such  as NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mit- 
subishi, Matsushita, Sharp, Sony, Sanyo, and Oki Electric-dominated  Japan’s 
industry and ensured a high degree of captive production, ranging from 75 
percent for Sanyo, to 55 percent for Matsushita,  50 percent for Fujitsu, and 
down to about 20 percent for NEC, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba in the 
mid-1980s. These firms also tended to specialize in the production of certain 
types of  semiconductors and trade these devices with one another based on 
long-term contracts or long-standing ties to one another. 
Japan overtook the United States in  overall semiconductor production by 
making substantial investments in production capacity. Indeed, throughout the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. industry failed to keep pace with the in- 
vestment rates of Japanese firms. According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD 1992, 147), Japanese firms devoted 
roughly  an  average of  28 percent of  their  sales to capital  spending during 
1978-85,  while the comparable figure for U.S. firms was  16 percent.  Such 
large investments were facilitated by a structural feature of Japanese industry 
that perhaps constituted its most decisive advantage over U.S. producers. Japa- 
nese firms are often affiliated with a large bank that can play a role in corporate 
governance through equity ownership and corporate board participation (such 
activities are illegal in the United States). Such bank ties not only gave Japa- 
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industry downturns much better than their U.S. counterparts. Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Scharfstein (1990) find evidence that Japanese firms with bank ties pro- 
duce and invest more in periods of  financial distress (cash flow disruptions) 
than firms without such bank connections. Thus, large and diversified Japanese 
firms with deep financial resources to undertake investments and sustain losses 
were  pitted  against  undiversified,  midsized  merchant  firms  in  the  United 
States. 
Indeed, continued production and investment by Japanese firms in the face 
of slack demand baffled and infuriated U.S. producers, who would scale back 
both activities in industry recessions. In the aftermath of the industry downturn 
in  1974-75,  a period in which foreign competition was not yet a serious con- 
cern, U.S. semiconductor firms were cautious about investing in additional pro- 
duction capacity. Consequently,  there was a shortfall in U.S.  capacity when 
semiconductor demand surged in 1977-even  IBM entered the merchant mar- 
ket as a purchaser of DRAMs. Then when price per bit equivalency between 
4K and  16K DRAMs was achieved in 1978, new Japanese producers aiming 
to enter the  16K market were able to satisfy the world demand that U.S. pro- 
ducers could not meet. Japan seized 40 percent of the 16K DRAM market by 
1979. This situation repeated itself in the next recession of  1981-82.  Demand 
again slackened just as U.S. firms had caught up and became well established 
in the 16K market. Japanese firms continued to invest and shifted production 
up to 64K chips, capturing 70 percent of that market by the end of 1981. 
The Japanese government also played a modest role in fostering domestic 
production of memory chips as a by-product of its effort to promote the domes- 
tic computer industry. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
sponsored  the  Very  Large  Scale  Integration  (VLSI)  program  of  1976-79, 
which directed $200 million in funds over four years, as well as interest-free 
loans, to several major manufacturers of semiconductors, such as Fujitsu, Hi- 
tachi, Mitsubishi, NEC, and Toshiba. These firms formed cooperative labora- 
tories for the joint development of basic seriiconductor technology (manufac- 
turing technology and circuitry design), although not product development. In 
comparison with similar programs in the United States (albeit skewed toward 
defense-related and not basic research), formal Japanese support for its semi- 
conductor industry was modest at best. But the perception that the programs 
constituted “unfair industry targeting” by MITI was fully exploited by the U.S. 
semiconductor  producers  and generated  sympathy for their pleas  in  Wash- 
ington. 
Aside from the different financial and economic structure of the Japanese 
semiconductor industry, U.S. firms faced several additional obstacles beyond 
their control. The SIA attributed the investment difficulties of member firms to 
the high cost of capital in the United States in the early and mid-1980s com- 
pared with Japan. The industry’s problems were exacerbated by the substantial 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar on foreign exchange markets in the early 1980s, 
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boost to the Japanese industry. The U.S. industry also left itself exposed to the 
potential entry of foreign rivals in several ways. The industry was unprepared 
for a change in process technology away from the standard N-channel metal 
oxide semiconductor (NMOS) to the complementary metal oxide semiconduc- 
tor (CMOS) favored by  Japan. Compounding these technical problems were 
questions about the quality of  U.S.  semiconductors. In a widely publicized 
paper  presented  at  an  industry  conference in  1981, a  representative  from 
Hewlett-Packard presented evidence that the firm  experienced many fewer de- 
fects on 16K chips from Japanese producers than from U.S. producers. This 
U.S. producers heatedly denied, but the perception (and later acknowledged 
reality) of  a quality gap allowed long-term supply contracts to shift to Japa- 
nese firms.23 
All of these factors contributed to an exodus of U.S. firms from the DRAM 
market: while there were 15 U.S. producers of the 4K chip, 12 of the 16K chip, 
and at one time 10 producers of the 64K chip, all except two merchants were 
driven from the market. Most firms simply abandoned DRAM production and 
concentrated on other product lines, but one firm  (Mostek) went bankrupt. 
With the onslaught of Japanese competition, two issues framed the U.S. in- 
dustry’s complaints: “dumping” and market access. The dumping complaints 
arose from the periodic sharp price declines that were a feature of the industry 
recessions. As Baldwin (1994) points out, the semiconductor market is one in 
which price rather than output adjusts in response to demand fluctuations; even 
in the industry recession of 1985, for example, output continued to grow rap- 
idly while prices fell steeply. This is a consequence of the underlying economic 
structure of the industry: low marginal costs of production induce firms, even 
in periods of soft demand, to cut margins and maintain production at high 
levels to generate additional re~enue.’~  Such industry recessions had occurred 
in the absence of foreign competition (as in 1974-75), but the rapid buildup 
of  production capacity by  Japanese firms (and their willingness to continue 
production and investment in the face of an adverse cash flow situation, due to 
the bank ties discussed  above) exacerbated the concomitant price collapses 
when demand was slack. This contributed to the steep declines in world prices 
in 1981 and 1985, illustrated in figure 1.1, of which the U.S. industry was a 
casualty. Despite the U.S. industry’s complaint that such “dumping” was “pred- 
atory” and “unfair,” price declines of this sort clearly do not require predatory 
intent or unfair competition when high production and inventory levels con- 
front a negative demand 
The U.S. industry also complained about the lack of access to Japan’s mar- 
23. This is recounted in Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein (1984). 
24. Marginal costs are so low that it may not pay to reduce output and thereby sacrifice revenues 
that might pay off fixed costs or be invested in the next generation of  semiconductors. Learning- 
by-doing effects, wherein cumulative experience helps improve yields and reduce costs, provide 
firms with an additional incentive to  keep output high even when demand is slack. 
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Fig. 1.1  Fisher-ideal price indexes, 1972-89 
Source: Flamm (1993b, 273). 
ket. Prior to  1975, imports of semiconductors into Japan were restricted by 
formal quotas and prior-approval requirements, and foreign investment was so 
strictly regulated as to be essentially forbidden. These restrictions were liberal- 
ized in 1975, after which few formal governmental trade barriers remained in 
place. Yet the US. share of the Japanese market scarcely budged after  1975. 
Supported by evidence that was necessarily anecdotal, the SIA claimed that 
informal nontariff  barriers lingered in Japan after  1975 and that MITI used 
active countermeasures to undermine the liberalization. One explanation for 
the failure of the formal liberalization to alter the U.S.  share was the structure 
of the Japanese industry. Not only was the structure of final demand different, 
but U.S.  merchants encountered difficulties in selling to captive producers and 
overcoming long-term relationships between Japanese 
26. As Okimoto (1989, 103ff., emphasis added) points out: 
The difficulties of breaking into the organizational nexus are particularly frustrating for foreign 
producers of high-tech intermediate goods, because the enclosed and long-term nature of  rela- 
tions  between  buyers and  sellers  alters the character  of  spot-market,  arms-distant  transac- 
tions. . . .  Instead of meeting all their needs on the merchant market, Japanese computer compa- 
nies make their own semiconductors and sell what they do not use. Captive, in-house production 
thus imposes limits on the expansion of  foreign shares in Japan's  semiconductor market.. . . 
Japanese industrial organization emphasizes the importance of extramarket factors, especially 
the strong preference for stable predictable, long-term business relationships based on mutual 
obligation and trust. This has had  the effect of raising the barriers to entry from the outside, 
whether by foreign manufacturers or by nonmainstream Japanese producers. Such nontarifbar- 
riers, deeply embedded in the structure of  the industrial economy, are not directly connected to 
Jupanese industrial policy. But their existence, whether by  design or by  accident, serves basi- 
cally the same function as formal measures of home market protection-only  more effectively, 
because they do not diminish the vigor of market competition between domestic producers. 29  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
The SIA sought to blame both the dumping and market access problems 
on the Japanese government, enabling them to invoke the politically attractive 
rhetoric of “fair trade” and to argue that the playing field of international com- 
petition was skewed. This was precisely the interpretation in The Efect of  Gov- 
ernment Targeting on World Semiconductor Competition,  published by the SIA 
in  1983, which set out to “describe the decade or more of coordinated effort 
by  the Japanese government to put  the Japanese producers in  a dominant 
world-wide position in key product lines.” 
According to the SIA, Japanese government support took three forms. First, 
the government provided direct and indirect financial assistance to the domes- 
tic industry. The SIA claimed that anywhere from $507 million to $2 billion 
was directed to Japan’s semiconductor industry during 1976-82 in government 
funds, as well as tax breaks and other advantages. These promotion policies 
supposedly provided a “favorable environment” that gave firms a willingness 
to invest  even  during a recession. By  reducing risks, this  led  to capacity- 
building races and, with a downturn in domestic demand, export “avalanches.” 
Second, the government formed a research cartel within the domestic industry 
to pool R&D resources and promote large firms. The government’s aim was to 
“organize and channel the collective resources of  Japan’s  largest electronic 
firms” to achieve domination of the world market. In addition, the government 
telecommunications monopoly transferred at little cost to NEC, Fujitsu, and 
Hitachi the design and manufacture technology of 256K DRAMS. Third, the 
government protected the domestic market for its semiconductor firms by con- 
doning and reinforcing “buy Japan” policies among its major producers and 
consumers. According to the SIA, the government undertook active counter- 
measures to undermine the liberalization in 1970s and 1980s. By securing the 
home market for domestic producers, Japanese firms benefited from the cost 
reductions associated with production experience, thereby assisting in their 
penetration of the world market. 
There are two noteworthy elements to this key SIA document. First, it does 
not explicitly accuse Japanese firms of dumping. The report argues that overca- 
pacity led to aggressive pricing by  Japanese firms, driving prices lower than 
they otherwise would be. But the report, in effect, concedes that because Japa- 
nese costs of  production were not known, no dumping complaint could be 
made. This is significant: while many individual U.S. semiconductor producers 
accused Japan of  dumping from the late  1970s, throughout the entire trade 
dispute the SIA itself never filed an antidumping petition. The captive produc- 
ers in the SIA prevented the group from taking a strong position on the dump- 
ing issue until the 1986 accord, when the merchant firms reasserted themselves 
in determining SIA positions. 
Second, the document pins the blame for the lack of  U.S. market access 
squarely on the Japanese government, not on the behavior of private firms or 
the structure of the Japanese market. This reflects the SIA’s preparation for a 
section 301  action against Japan. Section 301 of the Trade Act of  1974 pro- 
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been used to attack government policies (unlike the antidumping laws, which 
relate to the prices charged by private firms). If the R&D and capital invest- 
ments were made solely by shrewd private firms in Japan without government 
support, the sense of unfairness, and hence the claim to government assistance, 
would have been lost. 
To  remedy the situation, the SIA called for the U.S. government  to “an- 
nounce as U.S. policy  that foreign industrial targeting  practices will not be 
allowed to undermine U.S. technological and economic leadership in this criti- 
cal industrial sector.” In addition, the “U.S.  government must identify, analyze, 
and counter the distorting effects of foreign industrial targeting practices” by 
monitoring foreign developments such as predatory export drives and market 
barriers, promising to enforce U.S. trade laws as necessary. This is as close as 
the SIA came in this document to advocating antidumping duties. However, 
one recommendation stands out: “U.S. firms must receive real, not ‘cosmetic’ 
market access, reflected in significantly greater participation  by U.S. firms in 
the Japanese market. This will require an affirmative action program to normal- 
ize competition in Japan. The Japanese government should establish necessary 
programs to see that this result is achieved” (SIA 1983, 6). 
Thus, the report reflected the divisions within the SIA-no  consensus on 
whether antidumping measures were appropriate, but stronger sentiment that 
the Japanese market must be “opened up” in such a way that “the cash registers 
ring.” But the U.S. government lacked effective policy instruments to suspend 
the R&D or investment policies of  another country or to recast the vertical 
links or organizational structure of private foreign firms. Hence, the legal re- 
quirements of U.S. trade policy forced the SIA to address only the trade-related 
symptoms of  its problem, namely, the exports of semiconductors from Japan 
(through  antidumping  measures)  and  imports  of  semiconductors  by  Japan 
(through section 301). 
1.4  Early Industry Pressure, 1977-84 
The demands by U.S.  semiconductor producers for trade relief are strongly 
associated with the industry recessions of 1974-75,  1981-82,  and 1985-86; in 
intervening periods of high demand, the attention of  industry executives was 
diverted from pressing the government for actions on their behalf. The industry 
recession of  1974-75, predating large-scale production by Japanese firms, was 
not marked by significant foreign competition, and hence there was no signifi- 
cant pressure to limit imports or take other trade-related  action^.^' Yet Japan’s 
entry into the semiconductor market helped trigger the formation of the SIA 
27. In 1971, Sprague Electric Company, of North Adam, Mass., petitioned the U.S. Tariff Com- 
mission for adjustment assistance under section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Sprague 
complained about imports of capacitors, transistors, and integrated circuits, but the commission 
determined that  imports as a result of concessions  granted under trade agreements were  not a 
cause of  serious injury. 31  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
in 1977. But until the industry was actually harmed, there was little the govern- 
ment was prepared to do. “After a transcoastal pilgrimage to Washington to 
inform Robert Strauss, the U.S. Trade Representative during the Carter Admin- 
istration, that ‘the Japanese are coming,”’  writes Flamm (1993b, 256 n.  13), 
“semiconductor executives were reportedly dismayed to get a ‘so?’ reaction 
from Strauss.” The SIA prompted a Senate subcommittee of  the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development to request a report from the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) on the competitive position of the U.S. 
industry just as Japanese firms were making inroads in the 16K DRAM market 
in  1978. Issued in late 1979, the ITC report concluded that the U.S. industry 
could maintain its lead despite trade barriers abroad and foreign government 
support for their industry. 
Steeply falling prices for semiconductors during the industry recession of 
1981, along with the early Japanese capture of 70 percent of the market for 
64K DRAMS, triggered a more concerted political response by the U.S. indus- 
try. “It was at this juncture in the fall of 198  1 ,” recalls Clyde Prestowitz (1  988, 
148),  then deputy assistant secretary for international economic policy in the 
Department of Commerce, “that representatives of the U.S. semiconductor in- 
dustry began making regular trips to Washington,” among them Robert Noyce 
of Intel, Charles Sporck of National Semiconductor, and W.  Jerry Sanders I11 
of AMD. According to Prestowitz (1988, 149-50), who championed the indus- 
try’s cause within the government: 
These representatives of the semiconductor industry visited the departments 
of Commerce, State, and Treasury as well as the U.S. Trade Representative 
and members of Congress. They asked not for protection but for an end to 
the Japanese dumping, for the same opportunity to sell in Japan as the Japa- 
nese had in the United States, and for an end to Japanese copying of new 
chip designs. They got a reception as cool as the autumn weather in Wash- 
ington.  The lawyers, academic  economists, and  career bureaucrats  who 
filled many key government positions shared a suspicion of business as pro- 
tectionist and opposed to consumer interests. . . . Lionel Olmer and I, who 
represented the Commerce Department in these meetings with industry, dis- 
agreed, however, with the majority of other officials. 
This cool reception can be traced to several things. First, the newly installed 
Reagan administration had an ideological or, perhaps more accurately, rhetori- 
cal commitment to free trade and limiting government intervention in the econ- 
omy. The initial reaction of most Reagan officials to any industry complaining 
about foreign competition was likely to be one of skepticism. Many officials 
believed that this was the first time that these insulated U.S. producers had to 
confront the rude shock of foreign competition and that a healthy dose of such 
competition was no cause for alarm. Second, the U.S. semiconductor industry 
was hardly on its deathbed. While sales of the U.S. merchant semiconductor 
firms fell 7.1 percent in 1981, they had risen almost 30 percent in each of the 
preceding three years. According to SIA statistics, the merchant industry was 32  Douglas A. Irwin 
still profitable:  after three years in  which pretax  income as a percentage of 
sales was roughly 12 percent, this measure slipped to 4.7 percent in 1982 be- 
fore registering a slight loss of  -1.4  percent in 1983. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a formal complaint under U.S. trade law, it 
was unclear what specific action the industry wanted the government to under- 
take. Motorola  seriously considered  filing  an  antidumping petition  on 64K 
DRAMS in early  1982 but failed to do so to avoid antagonizing Hitachi, a 
Japanese partner, and for lack of industry support: IBM, as a new member of 
the SIA, strongly opposed such a move, and ultimately the SIA took no formal 
action. Instead, Motorola requested that the Commerce Department informally 
monitor Japanese prices. This request put government officials in an awkward 
situation because they could not really act without a formal complaint-“our 
only tools were bluff and persuasion,” lamented Prestowitz (1988, 150), who 
attributed the lack of a formal complaint from Motorola to the cost and length 
of time such an action would take rather than to divisions within the industry. 
At any rate, Lionel Olmer, who as under secretary for international trade was 
responsible  for  administering  the  antidumping  laws, warned  MITI that  the 
Commerce Department was inclined to monitor Japanese chip prices  in the 
United States. This led to an interesting instance of government agencies work- 
ing at cross-purposes: the mild  threat appeared  to “work”  in that MITI in- 
formed Japanese firms of this possibility and exports to the U.S. were reduced, 
but just months later the Department of Justice launched an antitrust investiga- 
tion into reports of Japanese collusion to raise prices in U.S. market!28 
The idea of a section 301 action was also broached in 1982. However, USTR 
William Brock advised the SIA against filing a petition because the case ap- 
peared weak. While the Japanese had captured a large share of  the DRAM 
market, the U.S.  share of  the world semiconductor market was still roughly 
twice Japan’s  share and the industry appeared  to be  in reasonable  financial 
health as well. Thus, the semiconductor industry was viewed as fundamentally 
sound and Japanese competition healthy for the industry. In this context, Brock 
reported the administration consensus that a section 301 action would not be 
viewed favorably. 
Yet  in the midst of the sharpest U.S. recession  in the postwar period with 
widespread fears of “deindustrialization,” concerns about the fate of this “sun- 
rise” industry could not be dismissed entirely by the administration. The entre- 
preneurial mystique surrounding Silicon Valley high-technology industries had 
bipartisan appeal in Congress, which demanded the administration at least ap- 
pear to be doing something about high-technology trade with Japan. Conse- 
quently, Brock formed a U.S.-Japan  High Technology Working Group to re- 
lieve trade-related tensions, although the working  group’s negotiations with 
28. Flamm (1993b. 262) reports that “the Japanese semiconductor industry openly acknowl- 
edged that these reductions in exports were spurred by  MITI guidance.” Nothing came of  the 
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Japan did not have a precise goal and were not viewed as a top priority within 
the U.S. government. Prestowitz (1988, 153-54) complained that 
we had to operate within the bounds of a consensus obtained from the vari- 
ous agencies on the U.S. negotiating team that included members of  the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Council of Economic Advisers, 
the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and 
the departments of  State, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Defense. The 
consensus was that, while it was appropriate to request better market access, 
asking for a specific market share or sales volume would violate free-trade 
doctrine and hence be unacoeptable. Similarly, with regard to dumping, col- 
lecting data on the volume of shipments was acceptable-but  not on prices, 
because in view of the Justice Department that might violate antitrust laws 
on price fixing.. . . Thus, before even talking to the Japanese, we limited 
ourselves to asking simply for a more open market, whose meaning we did 
not define, and a system of gathering statistics on semiconductor shipments. 
Moreover, the consensus, strongly influenced by the State Department and 
the National Security Council, would not allow-even  as a tactic-the  sug- 
gestion of any retaliation if Japan did not respond favorably for fear that the 
overall relationship between the two countries might be harmed. 
Discussions with Japan began in June 1982 and led to an accord in Novem- 
ber, which in Prestowitz’s (1988,  155) opinion  was more a “monument to 
clever  drafting  than  anything  else.”  Besides  stating  broad  principles,  an 
agreement was reached to reduce both country’s tariffs and to collect Japanese 
semiconductor shipment data (but not price information), allowing the Com- 
merce Department to better monitor the market. 
The agreement did nothing to change the underlying, fundamental determi- 
nants of supply or demand in the semiconductor market. Hence, “within three 
months, further threats of  congressional action along with the possibility of 
private unfair-trade suits drove the U.S. delegation to a second round of negoti- 
ations, one focusing entirely on market access,” Prestowitz (1988, 155) writes. 
The recommendations (it cannot really be called an agreement) that emerged 
from the working group in November 1983 called for complete tariff elimina- 
tion in the United States and Japan, better data collection, a removal of invest- 
ment barriers, and greater market access for U.S. firms. On market access, the 
text stated that “the Government of Japan should encourage Japanese semicon- 
ductor users to enlarge opportunities  for U.S.-based suppliers so that long- 
term relationships could evolve with Japanese companies.” But, according to 
Prestowitz (1988, 156), a key part of  the negotiations “was the confidential 
chairman’s note  from  Kodama  [the MITI  negotiator]  to Murphy  and  me 
[the U.S. negotiators], in which Kodama said that MITI would ‘encourage’ 
(a euphemism for ‘give guidance to’) the major Japanese chip users to buy 
more U.S. chips and to develop long-term relationships with U.S. suppliers.” 
This proved to be too weak a version of the “affirmative action” the industry 
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of  the Japanese  semiconductor  industry, this  moral  suasion would  be  inef- 
fective. 
The 1983 negotiations marked the end of the first round of U.S.-Japan dis- 
cussions over semiconductors. The round ended not because of success in re- 
solving any of the underlying grievances of the U.S. semiconductor industry, 
but because the industry entered a period of surging demand from mid-1983. 
Distracted by the business of filling orders and making new investments, indus- 
try executives took the heat off the government. 
Despite accomplishing little to resolve its trade dispute with Japan, the SIA 
did achieve several legislative and administrative goals during the pronounced 
industry expansion of 1983-84.  First, the SIA succeeded in its desire to elimi- 
nate tariffs on final and unfinished  semiconductors in the United States and 
Japan. As late as 1978, the United States maintained a 6 percent tariff on im- 
ported semiconductors, while Japan had a 12 percent tariff. In 1982, as a result 
of the first U.S.-Japan Working Group talks, both countries set their tariff at 
4.2 percent. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 authorized the president to nego- 
tiate even lower tariffs on semiconductors. In February 1985, USTR Brock and 
the foreign minister of Japan exchanged letters that eliminated most tariffs on 
semiconductors. 
Although major U.S. semiconductor firms already benefited from the off- 
shore assembly provisions  of the U.S. tariff code, the SIA wanted the addi- 
tional assurance that its members could ship semiconductor components into 
and out of the United States and Japan at no tariff charge.29  According to the 
SIA, this action would benefit U.S. producers more than Japanese exporters 
because 75 percent of U.S. imports were shipped by U.S. firms. Tariff elimina- 
tion, it argued, would save U.S. firms roughly $100 million per  year, which 
could be plowed back into R&D expenditures, as well as increase access to the 
Japanese market. The SIA further maintained that abolishing the duty would 
not result  in shifting production  abroad because  the tariff  was too small to 
influence plant location decisions. In addition, the SIA viewed a U.S.-Japan 
agreement to abolish semiconductor tariffs as establishing the principle of free 
trade, as well as a step toward securing greater governmental concern about 
reducing the alleged import barriers in Japan.  The AEA and the Computer 
and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association  (CBEMA), representing 
important semiconductor-using industries, also supported the proposed tariff 
elimination. 
The tariff elimination was opposed by  one small U.S. merchant producer, 
Micron Technology, whose production focused on memory chips, precisely the 
device most  subject to Japanese import competition. Micron contended that 
the move would increase Japan’s penetration of the U.S. market without chang- 
ing the ability of U.S. firms to sell in Japan. Micron also wanted to delay elimi- 
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nating the semiconductor tariff until the European Community and Korea also 
reduced their trade restrictions. Despite the European Community’s 17 percent 
tariff and Korea’s 30 percent tariff on semiconductors (at the time), both coun- 
tries would be eligible for duty-free shipments of semiconductors to the United 
States as the tariff abolition would apply on a most-favored-nation basis. 
The IBEW also opposed tariff reduction on the grounds that U.S. producers 
would shift production to foreign assembly plants as a result. They maintained 
that, because U.S. exports to Japan were so small and Japanese exports to the 
US. were so large, tariff elimination would give Japanese firms a .financial 
boon five times the amount of  US. firms. Japan, they argued, could reinvest 
these funds in R&D and further undermine the domestic industry. 
Given their failure to obtain a sympathetic hearing from the administration 
about possibly filing a section 301 petition, a second SIA objective was to 
broaden the scope of  governmental practices that could be actionable under 
the statute. Section 301 provided for government action against “unreasonable, 
unjustifiable, and discriminatory” foreign trade practices, but these key words 
were left undefined and gave open-ended discretion to the government in de- 
ciding to accept a petition. The Trade and Tariff Act of  1984 amended section 
301 by mandating that the definition of unreasonable “includes, but is not lim- 
ited to, any act, policy, or practice which denies fair and equitable market op- 
port~nities.”~~  The scope of section 301 was thereby broadened to include just 
the sorts of activities that the SIA was seeking to attack in Japan. 
Finally, Congress enacted SIA-supported legislation on intellectual property 
rights and R&D in 1984. The National Cooperative Research Act relaxed the 
antitrust treatment of joint R&D ventures and the Semiconductor Chip Protec- 
tion Act of  1984 prohibited the unauthorized copying of chip designs. 
1.5  Petitions, Procedures, and Negotiations, 1985-86 
The  1983-84  boom  ended with  yet  another industry  recession  in  1985. 
Compared with other downturns, this industry recession was extremely severe 
and was particularly concentrated on the memory chip market. While overall 
semiconductor sales slumped about 20 percent in  1985, the DRAM market 
contracted by  about 60 percent. The root cause was a brief slowdown in the 
computer market: after increasing by a factor of five between 1981 and 1984, 
domestic shipments of microcomputers actually fell 8 percent in 1985, as de- 
picted in figure 1.2. With chip shipments and inventories remaining relatively 
30. This was further strengthened (along lines desired by  the SIA) in the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of  1988 to include the denial of “fair and equitable market opportunities, 
including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by private 
firms or among private firms in the foreign country that have the effect of  restricting, on a basis 
that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United States goods to purchasing 
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Fig. 1.2  US.  domestic output of microcomputers 
Source: Computer Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, Information Technology In- 
dustry Databook, 1960-2002 (Waqhington, D.C., 1992), 94. 
high, prices collapsed in the face of  slumping demand. The price of  a 64K 
DRAM fell from roughly $3.00 in the first quarter of  1984 to $0.75 by  the 
middle of  1985; the price of 256K DRAMS fell from $3 1  .OO  to $3.00 over the 
same time period. Rapid price declines were always expected in the semicon- 
ductor industry because of learning by doing, but not so sharply in such a short 
period of time (see fig. 1.1). 
As a result, merchant semiconductor firms racked up unprecedented losses: 
pretax income as a percentage of  sales fell from over  14 percent in  1984 to 
almost -  10 percent in  1985. Capacity utilization among the merchant firms 
dropped from over 70 percent in 1984 to under 45 percent in  1985, according 
to SIA statistics. Merchant semiconductor employment fell nearly 20 percent 
(about 55,000 workers) in the first three quarters of  1985. The 1985 industry 
recession pushed virtually every U.S. producer out of  the DRAM market- 
Mostek went bankrupt, and AMD, Intel, Motorola, and National Semiconduc- 
tor abandoned DRAM production to concentrate on other semiconductor prod- 
uct lines. Only TI and Micron remained in the merchant DRAM market, al- 
though IBM and AT&T continued  captive production.  Imports  were  not  a 
direct cause of the recession: Japanese import penetration actually fell in the 
two years after 1984, and three-quarters of the fall in  revenues of U.S.-based 
semiconductor companies in 1985 was due to declining overall demand, only 
a quarter due to lost market share, according to calculations in Federal Inter- 
agency Staff Working Group (1987, 10). Indeed, Japanese firms experienced 
similar  losses and  layoffs as  world  demand  had  slumped in  an  integrated 
world market. 
Just as the industry recession of 1981-82  spawned industry efforts at politi- 
cal action, the  1985 recession precipitated  a similar response. As Prestowitz 
(1988, 159) dramatically put it, “With survival at stake in the spring and sum- 
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descended on Wa~hington.”~’  However, this descent received a much warmer 
welcome than had been the case in  1982. Then the industry was just one of 
many U.S. industries reeling from recession and appealing for help. Although 
the dollar was just peaking on foreign exchange markets, the U.S. economy 
was in its third year of  expansion in  1985, and fewer industries were facing 
the dire straits of the semiconductor industry. Therefore, competition among 
industries for the attention of policymakers was less intense. In 1982, the in- 
dustry was split on filing an antidumping petition and faced resistance on any 
section 301 action; in 1985, it pursued (and the government largely welcomed) 
both courses of action. 
The industry’s timing was propitious for a related reason: unlike 1982, the 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar on foreign exchange markets and the accompa- 
nying lurch into a large trade deficit served to focus the Reagan administration’s 
attention on international economic policy. The Economic Policy Council, the 
cabinet-level group chaired by Secretary of Treasury James Baker and respon- 
sible for formulating the administration’s  economic policy, met frequently dur- 
ing this period amid complaints about the gaping U.S. trade deficit from indus- 
tries highly exposed to international trade. The administration responded by 
formulating a two-pronged policy  of  containment: an exchange rate policy 
aimed  at  reducing  the  foreign  exchange  value  of  the  dollar,  and  market- 
opening initiatives aimed at diverting protectionist “pressure by focussing on 
measures to open up the Japanese market rather than closing the U.S. mar- 
ket.”3Z  After a strong “fair trade” speech by  President Reagan outlining this 
new approach in September 1985, the USTR for the first time began to self- 
initiate section 301 cases.33  The principal audience for this “tough” trade policy 
was Congress: the administration desperately sought to avoid a congressional 
trade bill that would force the president to impose sanctions (like the Gephardt 
amendment) against countries having a trade surplus with the United States.34 
With this political backdrop,  a high-profile industry in  search of  a market- 
opening initiative against Japan was far more likely than in previous years to 
achieve a sympathetic hearing from the administration. 
For its part, the semiconductor industry was so shaken by economic condi- 
31. Needless to say, the executives do not descend on Washington when times are good, and the 
financial losses of U.S.  firms were real in 1984-85.  Yet U.S. firms maintained large market shares 
in  many  categories  of  semiconductors  besides DRAMS and  were  noi  being  driven from  all 
markets. 
32. Niskanen (1988, 152). William Niskanen was the acting chairman of the Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers during 1984-85. 
33. The first three cases of what Jagdish Bhagwati has called “aggressive unilateralism” con- 
cerned Brazil’s informatics policies, Japan’s tobacco restrictions, and Korea’s insurance regula- 
tions. With the U.S. government acting on its own in self-initiated cases, the likelihood of retalia- 
tion is greater if no progress is made in reducing foreign trade barriers. The more symbolic Market- 
Oriented Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks with Japan also began, which aimed at increasing Japanese 
purchases of telecommunications, pharmaceutical, forest products, and other items. 
34. For a discussion of the political environment of trade policy in the mid-l980s, see Destler 
( 1992). 38  Douglas A. Irwin 
tions in early 1985 that the question was not whether to take action, but what 
particular  form the  action  should  take  within  the  constraints  and remedies 
specified under U.S. trade law. Filing a petition under U.S. trade law would 
constitute a formal request for a specific government remedy and would end 
the informal, ad hoc, and sporadic bilateral negotiations that had done little to 
alter the industry’s position vis-a-vis Japan. The advantage of filing under U.S. 
trade law was that by initiating a specific process, pressure would be placed on 
the Japanese to change their actions or face retaliation. This drove the industry 
once again toward a section 301 action. Other trade statutes were less attractive 
because their main remedy was simply the imposition of higher tariffs on semi- 
conductors. While individual merchant firms might desire higher tariffs on Jap- 
anese imports, captive producers ensured that the industry as a whole would 
not favor the imposition of tariffs that it had sought to eliminate in the first 
place. This made objectionable to the SIA applying either for escape clause 
protection under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (which, in addition, had 
a special ITC injury test, leaving no assurance that tariff protection would even 
be forthcoming) or for antidumping duties under section 731 of the Tariff Act 
of  1930 (more easily obtained because of  a more lax injury  standard). Just 
because the SIA was deadlocked on the antidumping issue, of course, did not 
constrain individual firms either inside or outside the association from propos- 
ing such remedies. 
Unlike most industries seeking assistance, the semiconductor industry had 
important links to the defense industry and therefore had a special appeal- 
national security-that  enabled the industry to seek invocation of section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of  1962. This statute permits the president, upon 
the recommendation of the Department of Commerce, to take remedial action 
against imports that threaten  to impair national  security. The semiconductor 
industry’s active friends  in  the  Commerce  Department,  combined  with  the 
view that semiconductors were a “strategic” component of U.S. defense, might 
have arranged this course of action.35  But the remedies would not be substan- 
tially different than  those obtained under the antidumping or escape clause 
laws, and market access in Japan was not a clear national security issue. 
Even though this option was never seriously considered, one might suspect 
that the Reagan administration would have supported the semiconductor indus- 
try’s pleas  on national  security grounds. Somewhat surprisingly, the foreign 
policy and national security agencies were divided in the semiconductor dis- 
pute. In the mid- 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency expressed its concern 
over U.S. dependence on foreign semiconductor products, a view strongly sup- 
ported in a 1987 report by the Defense Science Board, an industry advisory 
group. But the Department of Defense was neutral in the semiconductor dis- 
pute, not only because it usually  played a minor role in  trade policy  issues 
35. There is no ITC injury test under this statute, and Congress cannot override the president’s 
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overall but because another faction within the Pentagon supported inexpensive 
sourcing of microelectronic components from Japan, in their mind a key strate- 
gic ally with whom continued good relations were  The National Secu- 
rity Council  supported this position,  and its opposition  to any trade action 
against Japan deprived the industry of  a potentially influential supporter and 
meant  that  administration  support  for the  industry  on  “national  security” 
grounds was unlikely. Curiously enough, USTR Yeutter took the national secu- 
rity argument seriously and sometimes argued that position  against the Na- 
tional Security Advisor in cabinet-level meetings. 
In any event, section 301 and antidumping petitions were soon filed. Unlike 
the indecision of  1981-82,  the actual filing of complaints triggered an adminis- 
trative timetable at the end of which loomed the possible imposition of large 
retaliatory or antidumping duties. 
1.5.1 
The case for filing a section 301 petition first had to be made within the SIA. 
This action-involving  substantial legal resources and personnel time (both 
on the SIA staff and in individual firms)-was  financed by a special assess- 
ment above regular SIA membership dues to meet the estimated $900,000 cost. 
A draft version of  the petition supported by Intel and AMD called for import 
restraints on Japanese semiconductors should the negotiations on market ac- 
cess fail. IBM and other larger purchasers balked at this proposal, and to pre- 
vent the captive firms from opposing the petition altogether, the final version 
eliminated this demand. 
On June 14, 1985, the SIA filed apetition with the Office of the USTR under 
section 301 of the Trade Act of  1974. The general thrust of the SINS  complaint 
about market access in Japan was no different from what it had been in the 
early  1980s, only the context  (the Reagan  administration’s view  of  market 
opening), the law (section 301 as amended in 1984), and the USTR (Clayton 
Yeutter had replaced William Brock) had changed. The petition focused on 
four aspects of Japan’s semiconductor policy. First, the petition provided cir- 
cumstantial evidence of  market barriers in Japan. In 1984, the U.S. semicon- 
ductor industry accounted for over 83 percent of sales in the U.S. market, 55 
percent in the European market, 47 percent in the other (Asian) markets, but 
only 11 percent in the Japanese market. The U.S. share of the Japanese market, 
they noted, remained  fixed near  10 percent for a decade despite the formal 
liberalization of  the Japanese market in  1975. Second, the SIA argued that 
structural barriers in the Japanese market, such as “buy Japan” attitudes and 
reciprocal trading or tie-in relationships among firms, were an impediment to 
U.S. entry. Third, the Japanese government condoned anticompetitive practices 
and undertook  countermeasures  such as administrative guidance and VLSI 
Market Access and Section 301 
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subsidies to undermine the 1975 liberalization. Finally, by reducing investment 
risks and adding to capacity, these government policies promoted the dumping 
of semiconductors by Japanese firms. 
These actions, concluded the SIA, violated U.S. trade agreements with Ja- 
pan (article XI of the GATT on the transparency of trade barriers, and the 1983 
bilateral agreement on greater U.S. participation in the Japanese semiconduc- 
tor market), denied U.S. firms “fair and equitable market opportunities,”  and 
therefore were  “unreasonable”  under the  meaning  of  section 301. The SIA 
requested relief in the form of an “equivalence of market participation” in the 
Japanese market  and an end to “dumping.”  Therefore,  the  SIA encouraged 
USTR to get the Japanese government to stimulate greater purchases of U.S. 
semiconductors, to develop a price-cost framework to prevent dumping, and to 
initiate an investigation of antimonopoly law violations. If no settlement was 
reached, the SIA recommended sanctions against Japan to achieve these objec- 
tives as long as the sanctions would not deny domestic semiconductor consum- 
ers access to adequate volumes of these goods. 
The procedures governing USTR’s handling of section 301 cases are quite 
different from administered protection cases considered by the Commerce De- 
partment and the ITC. Once a section 301 petition  has been formally filed, 
USTR (in consultation with other agencies) has 45 days to accept or reject the 
petition. During this period, USTR and key agencies within the administration 
must be persuaded that the case is legitimate. Although section 301 cases are 
handled principally by USTR, they are constrained to the extent that they had 
to solicit (if not heed) advice from other agencies.37  More substantively, Lande 
and Van Grasstek (1986,42) note that “whereas Commerce and the USITC are 
intended to deal with cases solely on their objective merits as defined by the 
relevant statutes, the USTR’s task is more subjective. It must not only investi- 
gate the petitioner’s allegations, and determine  whether  a legal  right of  the 
United States has been violated, but also must be prepared to devise and pursue 
a negotiated  solution with a foreign government. The USTR both adjudicates 
and advocates these cases.” 
Consequently,  “the  USTR  exercises  greater  legal  and political judgment 
when it accepts a petition under section 301” than the Commerce Department 
does in  antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  investigations.  In  fact,  “the 
USTR has complete discretion to accept or reject petitions” and can reject a 
petition “if, in its judgment, the case might lead to unwanted political compli- 
cations for the United States.” Acceptance of a petition is treated as a serious 
matter because, once it is accepted and the United States begins to negotiate, 
37. As Prestowitz (1988, 424) notes: “The trade representative coordinates by chairing a series 
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making any trade policy means that virtually every agency of the government sits on these commit- 
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the government becomes an interested party and its credibility is at stake. The 
government must be persuaded that a real trade barrier exists and that a settle- 
ment is feasible. 
Thus, once the section 301 request had been filed, the SIRS  job had just 
begun. Now the administration had to be convinced not only that the case had 
merits, but that the U.S. could obtain a settlement with Japan that would not 
seriously affect diplomatic relations between the two countries. “Because Ja- 
pan is both friend and ally, and because the problem with Japan arose from a 
set of interrelated policies carried out over many years rather than from a spe- 
cific trade action,” Prestowitz (1988, 160) points out, “there was great reluc- 
tance in Washington, particularly at the Department of State and the National 
Security Council, to brand Japan an unfair trader.” The SIA sought to persuade 
all agencies in the administration, particularly those that might oppose the peti- 
tion,  such as the traditionally  skeptical Office  of  Management  and Budget 
(OMB) and Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), about the merits of its case. 
How as the section 301 petition initially received within the Reagan admin- 
istration? From Prestowitz’s (1988, 159-60)  perspective at the Commerce De- 
partment, “While Commerce and the Trade Representative’s office were sym- 
pathetic,  other  departments  such  as  State,  Treasury, the  National  Security 
Council, and even Defense argued that Japan had opened its market by remov- 
ing formal tariffs and quotas in 1975. They dismissed the countermeasures to 
the liberalization as merely a matter of Japanese government exhortation to its 
industry with no concrete significance and again blamed the problems of the 
U.S. industry  on poor management which had not taken the long-term view 
and had not really tried to get into the Japanese market.” This statement some- 
what overstates the hostility to the petition. Prior to the filing of a petition, the 
industry consults the administration on the advisability of takmg formal action. 
Unless there is positive feedback, a petition is unlikely to be filed, as happened 
in 1982. The SIA’s petition was attractive in many respects: it was in line with 
the administration’s emerging stress on opening foreign markets,  did not di- 
rectly advocate closing the U.S. market, and would help mollify congressional 
critics who wanted  a tougher Japan policy. Personal contacts also appear to 
have secured the petition a sympathetic hearing  at USTR. In  1985, William 
Brock (who had rejected a section 301 in  1982) had been replaced as USTR 
by Clayton Yeutter. The SIA main counsel, Alan Wolff of Dewey Ballantine, 
had worked with both Yeutter and his deputy, Michael Smith, at USTR in the 
Ford administration.38  Such high-level contacts in USTR ensured that the SIRS 
petition would receive serious consideration. 
Yet  Prestowitz’s recollection also captures  some of the  skepticism in the 
administration. Any  petition,  particularly  a controversial  one guaranteed  to 
38. Wolff was general counsel at USTR during 1975-77. Yeutter was deputy special trade repre- 
sentative at USTR during 1975-77.  Smith was chief of the Textile and Fiber Division at the State 
Department during 1973-75, chief textile negotiator at USTR during 1975-79,  and deputy special 
representative for trade negotiations at USTR during 1979-8  I. 42  Douglas A. Irwin 
generate a major confrontation with Japan, would encounter a fair degree of 
caution and even opposition  within  the administration. But  his recollection 
does not do justice to the troublesome problems with the petition. First, what 
were the “unfair”  and “discriminatory” government  trade  barriers that were 
actionable under section 301? The SIA pointed to past government policies, 
but no current practices, inhibiting imports. Aside from vague and amorphous 
claims about the policies and attitudes of  the Japanese government and firms, 
the SIA resorted to identifying the structure of the Japanese market as a bamer 
to trade. They merely observed that the largest semiconductor producers were 
also major consumers, that captive production was large (25 percent of total 
consumption), and that producers engaged in reciprocal trading. By SINS  num- 
bers, foreign firms already had nearly  20 percent of  the Japanese market  if 
captive production  was excluded from “the market” as it was in  the United 
States. 
As for the widely distributed SIA pie charts showing country shares in re- 
gional markets, an alternative hypothesis was consistent with no Japanese un- 
fair practices: U.S. producers dominated the U.S. market, Japanese producers 
dominated the Japanese market, and U.S. producers essentially split European 
and  other markets  with  other producers,  holding a slightly higher  share in 
Europe owing to long-standing direct investments in Europe behind the tariff 
barrier that kept out Japanese imports. The strongest statement the SIA could 
muster was that “these trade [market share] figures, coupled with Japan’s pro- 
tectionist heritage  in microelectronics, strongZy suggests that market barriers 
still exist in Japan.”39  To economists at OMB, CEA, Justice, and elsewhere, no 
compelling, persuasive  evidence of  market  barriers  existed: defunct govem- 
ment policies, vertical integration (like IBM and AT&T), and long-term rela- 
tionships hardly seemed to constitute actionable unfair trade practices. To wit, 
Japanese access to the U.S. market in the early 1980s may have been hindered 
by a discriminatory distribution system.40 
These economists also pointed out that US. semiconductor firms were the 
beneficiaries of just as much government  support as Japanese semiconductor 
producers.  In  1986, U.S.  government  financial  support  for  semiconductor 
R&D outstripped  Japan’s  support by  a factor of  10, although  U.S.  support 
tended to be not commercial, but defense related.41  The SIA wanted  “equal 
market access,” but the U.S. market share in Japan was comparable to the Japa- 
nese market share in the United States. Furthermore, the current industry reces- 
39. SIA and Dewey Ballantine, Japanese Market Barriers in Microelectronics,  Memorandum 
in Support of  a Petition Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of  1974, as amended, June 14, 
1984 (Washington, D.C., 1985). 2. Emphasis added. 
40. US.  semiconductor firms contained Japanese access to the US. market by terminating con- 
tracts with distributors who agreed to carry Japanese products. Japanese semiconductor firms had 
only one nationwide distributor in the United States (Marshall Industries) because of the “unspo- 
ken ban on Japanese franchises” and the “dictum that large houses will not take on the Japanese so 
long as they are supported by domestic suppliers” (see Electronic News, December 9, 1985, S28). 
41. Federal Interagency Staff Working Group (1987, 31). 43  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
sion was worldwide, with no import surge in the United States and with Japa- 
nese firms experiencing financial losses and layoffs as well. If the SIRS  case 
appeared weak to government economists, the remedies proposed by the SIA 
appeared worse. They feared that any governmental agreement would result in 
a worldwide cartel  with the government fixing prices and arranging market 
shares by fiat. The SIA was requesting an unprecedented package: a promise 
by the Japanese government to force its firms to raise its prices, not just in the 
United States but in all markets, as well as agree to a market share performance 
target for market access. Left unclear was precisely the Japanese government’s 
obligation and mechanism by which those ends would be achieved. Although 
the SIA never filed a dumping complaint, the section 301 petition also touched 
on the sensitive issue of antidumping remedies, raising  questions about the 
appropriateness of this avenue of relief. 
In its persuasion effort, the SIA tried to ensure that there were no obvious 
domestic opponents to the petition by coopting potential opposition. No one 
could seriously object to the principle of market access, but the mention of 
antidumping measures in the petition raised some alarms. The AEA was the 
one organization containing major semiconductor users and might object to 
policies that increased the price of semiconductors. Many members of the AEA 
were sympathetic to anything that resembled market opening in Japan, a prece- 
dent that many of its members would have liked to see established and emu- 
lated for their own industry. These semiconductor users could not foresee any 
possible resolution of a section 301 case that could harm its interests. The SIA 
shrewdly consulted with the AEA before and after filing the petition, and in 
the end the AEA wrote a letter to USTR  supporting the petition.  However, 
semiconductor  equipment  manufacturers  publicly  opposed  the  petition  be- 
cause they would be hurt by efforts to reduce Japanese production investments, 
but they appear not to have engaged in lobbying efforts.42 
The SIA also hired a public relations firm to elicit media coverage and orga- 
nized a support group of 20 congressmen from both political parties to spear- 
head activities on Capitol Hill. They put pressure on the administration to sup- 
port  the  SIA’s  petition,  often  writing  letters  to or  holding  meetings  with 
administration officials,  or organizing votes on nonbinding resolutions. Per- 
haps the most important congressional service to the SIA was providing access 
to key  administration  officials.  Senator Alan  Cranston  of  California  set up 
meetings for SIA representatives with Secretary of State George Shultz. At 
one meeting, recounted by  Coleman (1 987), Secretary Shultz was apparently 
impressed with SIA charts depicting the low U.S. market share in Japan com- 
pared to other markets and was evidently persuaded of the merits of their case. 
42. As an official of the  Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturing Institute stated, “I can tell 
you that American semiconductor production equipment firms are  being kept  alive today  only 
from Japanese orders. We have ‘zero’ orders from US.  semiconductor manufacturers. If it weren’t 
for the Japanese manufacturing expansion, many U.S.  equipment firms would be out of business” 
(Electronic News, June 24, 1985, 62). 44  Douglas A. Irwin 
The State Department’s traditional defense of Japan was muted in this particu- 
lar case, an achievement that could not have happened without converting the 
secretary. This in turn may not have happened had not a senator insisted on a 
meeting with one of the busiest administration officials. 
By contrast, the scope for Japanese lobbying while the petition was being 
considered was actually quite limited. Recognizing that congressional support 
would never be forthcoming in the current environment, the Japanese govern- 
ment concentrated their diplomatic efforts on the foreign policy establishment, 
such as the State Department and National  Security Council, to forestall the 
section 301 action. The EIAJ and the SIA kept the international trade lawyers 
busy by filing counterbriefs to each other’s briefs. The EIAJ argued that U.S. 
firms were successful in the Japanese market, that Japanese market structure 
did not prevent U.S. participation, and that the section 301 case was not action- 
able because no current government practice was identified. The EIAJ strenu- 
ously objected to giving the SIA a “guaranteed” market share in Japan. 
In the end, the pressures to move forward with a significant market-opening 
initiative against Japan triumphed. Less than a month after the filing of the SIA 
petition, USTR initiated the semiconductor case and requested consultations 
with the government of Japan. 
1 S.2  Antidumping 
The opposition of the captive producers to higher tariffs on semiconductors 
prevented the SIA from ever filing an antidumping complaint. This did not, of 
course, prevent any individual member from filing on its own, although there 
would be pressure not to break ranks from the SIA consensus. But the anti- 
dumping issue was forced by a small semiconductor firm that was (at the time) 
not even a member of the SIA-Micron  Technology of Boise, Idaho. On June 
24, 1985, Micron filed an antidumping complaint against four principal Japa- 
nese exporters of 64K DRAMS-NEC,  Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Oki-alleg- 
ing that these firms had been dumping DRAMs in the U.S. market. Further- 
more, Micron contended that the home market sales of the Japanese producers 
were below their costs of production so that the foreign market value (the “fair” 
U.S.  sales price) had to be based on constructed value (i.e., a U.S. government- 
imputed cost of production). 
How could Micron argue that it represented the industry with the SIA ac- 
tively in place? If the relevant market for determining legal standing is judged 
to be 64K DRAMs alone, then  all U.S. merchant producers except Micron 
and TI had abandoned DRAM production by the end of  1985. While the SIA 
remained formally neutral in the antidumping process, AMD, Mostek, Mo- 
torola, National  Semiconductor, TI, and Intel all indicated their support fur 
the petition during the ITC investigation.  (Motorola, TI, and Intel even sent 
representatives to testify before an ITC hearing.) The participation  of TI, the 
only other remaining producer of DRAMs, is somewhat surprising. TI did not 
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semiconductors  and had  long-standing  direct investments. Both AT&T and 
IBM as captive producers took no position on the petition, and silence is gener- 
ally viewed as support. 
Merchant members of the SIA soon broke ranks: on September 30, 1985, 
Intel, AMD, and National Semiconductor filed for antidumping action against 
imports of EPROMs from Japan, aimed primarily at Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and 
Fujitsu. Notably absent from this list once again was TI, the largest U.S. pro- 
ducer of EPROMs. Like Micron, these producers claimed that Japanese home 
prices were below their costs of production so that the foreign market value 
had to be determined by means of constructed value. 
Then  Prestowitz  (1988,  161) at  the  Commerce Department  stepped in. 
“Since shock treatment was needed in order to get some negotiating leverage, 
I recommended that the U.S. government do what it had the legal authority to 
do but never had done before: start its own dumping case on 256K RAM chips 
without waiting for private industry to file a suit, and thus move the government 
from the position of intermediary to one of  Secretary of  Com- 
merce Malcolm Baldrige agreed, and the proposal went to a cabinet-level trade 
task force, which-after  contentious discussions-did  not oppose it. In De- 
cember 1985, the Commerce Department self-initiated an antidumping case 
on 256K and future generations of DRAMS. 
The scope for Japanese lobbying in such administrative trade cases is se- 
verely limited. The antidumping process is one in which the provision of infor- 
mation can be important but is not susceptible to much influence as a result of 
foreign pressure. Each of the “defendants”-NEC,  Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubi- 
shi, Toshiba, and Oki-hired  separate legal counsel in the United States to 
defend their cases before the Commerce Department and the ITC. But once 
the petitions had been filed and the formal antidumping administrative process 
was underway, there were great incentives for the Japanese to settle the dispute 
with the petitioners directly rather than to see the antidumping process through 
in the hopes of vindication: the Commerce Department virtually always finds 
dumping, often at high  margins,  although  there  is some uncertainty  about 
whether the ITC will find final injury. Faced with the likely prospect that anti- 
dumping duties will be imposed, the antidumping process affords an opportu- 
nity for the domestic industry and their foreign competitors to arrive at some 
mutually agreeable solution, such as a VER. The strict timetable of the anti- 
dumping process-cases  must be resolved within roughly 280 days-provides 
a fixed deadline for such negotiations. 
As the semiconductor antidumping petitions ground through the administra- 
tive trade bureaucracy toward the inevitable conclusion, the pressure steadily 
built on Japan. In August 1986, the ITC issued a preliminary determination in 
43. The Commerce Department acquired statutory authority over the antidumping laws in 1979. 
The Treasury Department had initiated several cases on its own related to the trigger-pricing  mech- 
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the 64K DRAM case affirming that there was a reasonable indication of mate- 
rial injury  to the domestic industry by  means of imports. In December, the 
Commerce Department announced its preliminary determination that Japanese 
firms were pricing at less than fair value. But by this time, the negotiations 
had begun. 
1.6  The Semiconductor Trade Agreement of  1986 
After many preliminary discussions in late 1985, negotiations between MITI 
(and the EIAJ) and USTR (and the SIA) to settle both the antidumping and the 
market access questions began in earnest in early 1986. The deadline imposed 
by  the section 301 statute for the negotiations was July  1, although this was 
later extended to July 31, which was also when the final antidumping determi- 
nations were due from the Commerce Department. Since no party (with the 
possible exception of Micron) had an interest in seeing the antidumping duties 
imposed, this date became the fixed endpoint to the negotiations,  which, of 
course, lasted until the last moment with an agreement finally being reached 
shortly before midnight on July 30.u 
The objectives of the parties can be briefly described as follows. MITI and 
the EIAJ wanted an agreement that would end both the section 301 and anti- 
dumping cases without making specific promises to guarantee market access 
or prevent third-country dumping. These were precisely the issues that the SIA 
viewed as essential parts of any agreement: an end to dumping on a worldwide 
basis  and “real” market access in Japan. Any agreement that just prevented 
dumping in the United States would be inadequate; this would not only make 
the United States a “high-price island‘’ of semiconductors to the detriment of 
domestic user industries but (more directly in the SIRS interest) would harm 
the sales of U.S. firms in third markets as Japan shifted its sales elsewhere. The 
SIA also required not just better opportunities for sales in Japan, but the actual 
realization of sales (“the cash registers must ring,” as it was put at the time) to 
be assessed by a quantitative appraisal of market access. On the basis of studies 
it had commissioned, the SIA believed it would have at least 24-40  percent of 
the Japanese market under “free” conditions and wanted the agreement to stip- 
ulate some explicit target share. 
For its part, USTR essentially wanted any agreement that satisfied the SIA. 
Although only government officials could be present at and participate in the 
formal negotiations,  held  in the Winder Building  (which houses USTR, on 
17th Street across from the Old Executive Office Building in Washington), SIA 
representatives were often in an adjacent room, available for close consulta- 
tions during the negotiations and ready to advise USTR about what was accept- 
44. The principal negotiators with final responsibility for the agreement were Clayton Yeutter, 
the USTR, and Michio Watanabe, the minister of  MITI. Their deputies (Michael Smith and Ma- 
kato Kuroda) and staff handled most of the detailed negotiations. 47  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor  Industry 
able and what was  The principal location of the negotiations in Washing- 
ton is also not insignificant as the USTR negotiators thereby benefited from 
the services of the US.  intelligence community, which appear to have played 
a role at more than one juncture in this dispute. 
The sticking points  of  the negotiations  were, as expected, third-country 
dumping and market access. In early 1986, MITI offered to institute an export 
price floor or related VER on shipments to the United States. The industry and 
therefore the administration rejected this offer because it would still permit 
dumping in third markets. On market access, MITI also approached members 
of the SIA and reportedly offered to guarantee 20 percent of the purchases of 
Japan’s five largest users of chips to U.S. suppliers by  1990. The SIA rejected 
this offer as disingenuous because it would only raise the U.S. market share in 
Japan 4 percentage points to about 13 
Meanwhile, the antidumping cases were slowly grinding their way through 
the trade bureaucracy. In January  1986, the ITC ruled without dissent in the 
256K+  DRAM case that there was a “reasonable indication” the domestic 
industry  was materially  injured.  In March,  the Commerce Department  an- 
nounced preliminary  dumping margins  on EPROMs and 256K  and higher 
DRAMs. Reported with the Commerce Department’s usual precision, the mar- 
gins were astounding, ranging from 21.7 to  188.0 percent for EPROMs and 
from 19.8 to 108.72 percent (for a weighted average of 39.68 percent) for 256K 
and 1M DRAMs. Upon the announcement of preliminary margins, importers 
had to post bond, meaning the duties went temporarily into effect. At the end 
of April, the Commerce Department issued its final dumping determination in 
the 64K DRAM case against four major Japanese firms, with a weighted aver- 
age 20.75 percent dumping margin (ranging from 11.87 to 35.34 percent). It 
must be made clear what these determinations implied-that  Japanese prices 
in the United States (foreign market values) were below the constructed cost 
figures of what prices “should have been” in Japan. It is by no means evident 
that  Japanese  firms were pricing  below  average costs and therefore  losing 
money on sales to the United States. To  the contrary, according to the Com- 
merce Department’s report, the one Japanese firm that provided verifiable profit 
data for the first six months of 1985 on 64K DRAM sales earned a profit that 
exceeded the 8 percent statutory minimum, and this profit was imputed to oth- 
ers in determining the foreign market value of Japanese  export^.^' 
45. The USTR, Clayton Yeutter, speaking at an SIA dinner in September 1986, remarked: “With 
so many familiar faces in the audience, I feel particularly at home here this evening. We joked in 
Washington that many of you were becoming permanent fixtures at USTR during the innumerable 
days (and nights) of  semiconductor talks with the Japanese” (Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, United 
States Trade Representative, Remarks at  Semiconductor Industry Association Annual Forecast 
Dinner, September 23, 1986, Santa Clara, Calif.). 
46. MITI sometimes communicated directly with specific members of the SIA rather than the 
U.S. government or the industry association itself, possibly in an effort to divide the industry. 
47. Federal Registel; April 29, 1986, 15946; also USITC (1986c, a-11). 48  Douglas A. Irwin 
At the end of May, the ITC voted 4-2  in the final determination in the 64K 
DRAM case that the domestic industry was materially injured, the affirmative 
citing the poor financial condition of domestic producers as well as the sharp 
decline  in  market  prices.  This  outcome  presaged  a  similar  finding  in  the 
256K+  DRAM  case  and  thus  made  it  absolutely  clear  that,  barring  an 
agreement, the antidumping duties would remain in effect with the Commerce 
Department’s final determination. Two dissenting commissioners, however, ar- 
gued that the industry was experiencing a normal cyclical downturn with no 
evidence  of  injury  by  means  of  imports.  Commissioner  Anne  Brunsdale 
pointed to two  striking facts. First, import penetration  of Japanese DRAMs 
had actually fallen sharply: the ratio of  imports from Japan to apparent US. 
consumption dropped to 13.5 percent in 1985, from 23.6 percent in 1984 and 
29.3 percent in  1983. Second, ITC data indicated that the 64K DRAM had 
been quite profitable for the industry: gross profits by US.  and Japanese firms 
amounted to $165 million over 1983-85  with an average margin of nearly  18 
percent (the particularly large margins in 1983 and 1984, reaching 33.2 percent 
in 1984, compensated for deep losses in 1985).48  The final Commerce Depart- 
ment  determinations  on  EPROMs were  due  on  July  30,  and  on  256Kt- 
DRAMs on August 1, with the final ITC rulings in these cases slated for Sep- 
tember. 
The large preliminary antidumping findings and the first material injury de- 
cision strengthened the bargaining position  of  U.S.  negotiators even further: 
Japan had to settle the case to avoid the automatic and nonnegotiable imposi- 
tion of these duties, as well as possible section 301 sanctions. Congress rein- 
forced the leverage of U.S. negotiators: in May, the House of Representatives 
voted 408-5  to recommend that the administration take some action (i.e., retal- 
iate) under section 301 if it could not secure a market access agreement with 
Japan. The Japanese also confronted  a broad  administration consensus  that 
some type of semiconductor trade agreement was needed. In late June, Deputy 
USTR Michael Smith informed the Japanese that the cabinet was prepared to 
retaliate if no agreement was reached. This apparently was a bluff, but a highly 
credible bluff n~netheless.~~ 
In the end, Japan largely capitulated and acceded to most of the U.S. negoti- 
ator’s (i.e., industry’s) demands. While USTR did quite well in securing what 
the SIA wanted, the EIAJ felt abandoned by MITI, which may account for its 
later reluctance to adhere to MITI’s guidelines enforcing the agreement. How- 
ever,  the  agreement  was plagued  by  two problems  regarding  third-country 
dumping and market access that soon brought the governments into renewed 
conflict with one another: (1) the considerable ambiguity as to the exact obliga- 
48. USITC (1986c, 48, 53). 
49. According to Prestowitz (1988, 171), “In fact, no one will ever know whether the cabinet 
would actually have voted against the Japanese. To  some extent Smith’s move was a ploy to scare 
them.” Prestowitz also notes that “the critical change had been at the State Department, which for 
years had acted to protect Japan from its critics.” 49  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor  Industry 
tions of the government of Japan and (2) the inexact timetable for achieving 
the objectives of the agreement. 
Under the agreement, Japan agreed to take actions that would end dumping 
in the United States. The antidumping provisions of the arrangement hinged 
on a suspension agreement between the Department of Commerce and the in- 
dividual Japanese firms in which Japanese exporters agreed to report data on 
all U.S. sales and on actual and anticipated costs of production. Based on this 
information, the Commerce Department  would determine company-specific 
price floors (foreign market values, or FMVs) each quarter and provide this 
information to the Japanese  In monitoring prices and costs of ship- 
ments to the U.S. market, the agreement stipulated that “the Government of 
Japan will take appropriate actions .  . . to prevent exports at prices less than 
company-specific fair value.” The agreement primarily concerned DRAMS  and 
EPROMs, but the United States reserved the right to add or drop semiconduc- 
tor products from the list. 
Despite the U.S. understanding that Japan was obligated to prevent dumping 
in third-country markets,  the agreement makes no explicit statement of the 
government’s responsibility for taking action to prevent such dumping. In a 
separate  section of  the  agreement  on third markets,  the text merely reads: 
“Both Governments recognize the need to prevent dumping.. . . In order to 
prevent dumping, the Government of Japan will monitor, as appropriate, costs 
and export prices on the products exported by Japanese semiconductor firms 
from Japan.” There is no mention of the government of Japan taking “appro- 
priate  actions,” and  MITI  later denied responsibility  for preventing  third- 
country dumping, although the phrase “in order to prevent dumping” implies 
some measure of responsibility. 
On the issue of market access, how did U.S. negotiators handle the SIA’s 
demand for specific targets for increasing sales in Japan? In 1985, in the midst 
of congressional pressure over the surging trade deficit, the administration had 
considered but rejected a proposal that Japan import a specified quantity of 
U.S. manufactured  Even if the notion of import targets had been circu- 
lating within the administration for congressional consumption, market open- 
ing under section 301 usually took the form of removing a formal government 
trade barrier, such as a quota or some form of nonnational treatment, and then 
allowing the market to operate without interference. There was still great resis- 
tance to specifying an exact import market share because it smacked of man- 
50. The purpose of company-specific FMVs was to avoid a fixed export price floor and allow 
low-cost producers the freedom to cut prices. 
51. According to Niskanen (1988, 1521, “In preparation for the Reagan-Nakasone meeting in 
January 1985, a paper prepared by  [Beryl] Sprinkel [then undersecretary for monetary affairs at 
the Department of Treasury, and later chairman of the CEA] proposed that the United States insist 
that the Japanese  set quantitative targets to  increase manufactured  imports; this proposal  was 
broadly supported, against my lonely opposition, through four cabinet council meetings until the 
intervention of  [Secretary of State] Shultz and  [Secretary of Defense] Weinberger reminded the 
president of our larger interests in Japan.” 50  Douglas A. Irwin 
aged trade and raised questions of  how Japan could implement such targets. 
Prestowitz (as an advocate of targets) provides one perspective on this point: 
It’s not that we don’t try to force the Japanese to make the commitments; it’s 
more that we ourselves are loathe to spell out just what the commitment 
should be. To some extent, the Japanese outnegotiate us, but they do so be- 
cause we handicap ourselves. We  never allow our negotiators to negotiate 
for an explicit share. In this negotiation of semiconductors, our negotiators 
could never actually ask for 20 percent. And the reason was not because the 
Japanese didn’t let them; the reason was because our own trade policy, our 
own thinking about economics, prevents us from asking for a market share. 
We think it’s contradictory to the free-market principles that we uphold. So 
we never allow our negotiators  to ask for anything concrete. And so they 
were always in a position  where they ask for market access. The Japanese 
say, “You have market access.” And our negotiators say, “Yeah, but we never 
sell anything.” The Japanese say, “Well, how much do you want?” And the 
Americans can never respond to that. They often have to say we want sig- 
nificantly  more. The Japanese  say,  “That’s fine. How  much  more?” And 
Americans say, “Buh-buh-buh-buh-buhhh.”  The Japanese say, “How about 
. . .” and they name a number. Then you get into winking and nodding across 
the table. (Quoted in Warshofsky  1989, 167-68) 
The official text of  the  1986 agreement supports this view, simply stating 
that “the Government of Japan will impress upon the Japanese producers and 
users of semiconductors the need to aggressively take advantage of increased 
market access opportunities in Japan for foreign-based firms which will im- 
prove their actual sales performance. . . .  Both Governments agree that the ex- 
pected improvement in access should be gradual and steady over the period of 
this Arrangement.” This language is little different from the 1983 High Tech- 
nology Agreement in which MITI agreed to encourage Japanese firms to buy 
US. semiconductors. 
Contra Prestowitz, however, a “number” was discussed at various levels in 
the government from the start of the negotiations because that was the specific 
remedy proposed by the SIA. Yet  final authority to request a specific number 
(a highly sensitive and controversial issue) is appropriately limited to cabinet- 
level officials, specifically the USTR, rather than lower-level bureaucrats. In 
this case, USTR Yeutter explicitly asked for 20 percent in a Tokyo meeting 
with Minister Watanabe on May 28, 1986. A now infamous, secret side-letter 
to the final agreement, reproduced in the appendix, explicitly mentions the 20 
percent market share. However, the language of the secret side-letter is vague, 
reading simply that “the Government of Japan recognizes the U.S. semicon- 
ductor industry’s expectation” that sales will rise to “slightly above 20 percent” 
in five years and that “the Government of Japan considers that this can be real- 
ized.” This language surely is ambiguous as to whether it constitutes a binding 
governmental  commitment,  and this  later proved  to be  a source of  dispute. 
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tially  published  in  the  Financial  Times  prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the 
agreement), the letter remained officially secret-and  in fact was withheld by 
USTR from other government agencies.52  This secrecy allowed both sides to 
deny that they had carved up markets in a “managed trade” agreement, but 
the effect of the secrecy was asymmetric: Japan denied there was any explicit 
commitment about guaranteeing a market share, while the United States held 
Japan accountable for such a commitment though it could not produce the text 
in public to support its position. 
With the agreement in place, Japan confronted the next critical issue: how 
was it to be enforced? What policy measures and instruments did they have at 
their disposal, beyond mere exhortation, to guarantee that Japanese firms did 
not dump in the world market and bought the requisite amount of  foreign- 
made chips? Implementation-quite  mistakenly-was  not viewed as a major 
concern for U.S. negotiators, but it was a real problem  for Japan precisely 
because it was now committed to certain actions in a governmental agreement 
and under threat of sanction if the terms of the agreement were violated. Hav- 
ing made a commitment, Japan now faced the burden of malung the agreement 
work. The U.S. government now expected Japan to adhere to the agreement, 
illustrating how the semiconductor industry had turned its grievance into the 
government’s affair. 
To prevent dumping, the Japanese government (specifically, MITI) did the 
only thing it knew how to do-reduce  the quantity of semiconductors exported 
in an effort to raise export prices  sufficiently. MITI essentially imposed an 
“antidumping VER”-an  export restraint designed to meet a price target rather 
than a quantitative target, and therefore inherently more difficult to administer. 
MITI issued supply and demand forecasts to provide targeted production levels 
and induce firms to trim output. MITI had no statutory authority to force any 
firm  to comply in reducing output, but bureaucratic delays in approval of ex- 
port licenses-also  tightened to prevent dumping-could  unexpectedly arise 
for recalcitrant  firms. These guidelines  and regulations  were  at first easily 
evaded, and MITI’s initial efforts to prevent dumping were not fully successful 
and semiconductors leaked out of Japan into third markets. TI-Japan was re- 
portedly one of the least cooperative firms in cutting output and adhering to its 
FMV for sales to the United States. 
The agreement’s first problem materialized even before the official signing 
of the agreement on September 2, 1986.s3  In August, the Commerce Depart- 
ment issued the first quarterly FMVs, and because the minimum prices were 
based  on old production  data, by  late September the U.S.  price of  a 256K 
DRAM had almost doubled. Semiconductor users in the AEA were shocked. 
They regarded the high antidumping margins announced during the course of 
52. This secrecy bred deep suspicion in other executive agencies of  USTR and Commerce, 
53.  The SIA supported a public signing of  the agreement in  the Rose Garden of  the White 
particularly as the market access commitment became one of  the grounds for retaliation. 
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the negotiations as a bargaining tool and (perhaps naively) never actually be- 
lieved that they would be implemented. The AEA complained that members 
might have to move production of computers and other electronics goods over- 
seas to avoid high U.S. semiconductor prices. The CBEMA wrote to the com- 
merce secretary requesting a change in the methodology for setting FMVs. The 
SIA sought to sooth these concerns by bringing better data to the Commerce 
Department,  and prices  were  brought down when  the  next quarter’s FMVs 
were issued. 
The second problem concerned the issue of third-country  dumping. In late 
October, the SIA complained to USTR that such dumping was continuing and 
proposed retaliation for Japan’s noncompliance with the agreement. After con- 
sultations with USTR, MITI issued a directive urging dumping to cease. Yet 
MITI continued to  have difficulty  in getting Japanese firms to comply with 
the request and prices continued to be depressed in third markets. A striking 
differential in  semiconductor prices  arose across international markets, and 
colorful stones surfaced of arbitragers purchasing chips in Asia, flying them 
to Canada or Mexico, and then smuggling them across the U.S. border. The 
trunk of a passenger vehicle supposedly accommodates approximately 25,000 
chips, meaning a price difference of $2 or so per chip can save a firm upward 
of $40,000 in one car! 
The third problem arose in early October when the European Community 
strenuously objected to the semiconductor accord and filed a complaint before 
the GATT. The European Community argued that the third-market provisions 
set “arbitrary  [price] increases”  for European  semiconductor consumers and 
the market access provisions  afforded U.S. firms “privileged  access” to the 
Japanese market. A GATT panel ruled in 1988 that monitoring of export prices 
on third-market sales by Japan violated article XI of the GATT (on governmen- 
tal  quantitative  restrictions),  although  the  market  access  provisions  of  the 
agreement were not found to violate most-favored-nation  treatment. As a re- 
sult, Japan announced that it would desist from monitoring sales in third coun- 
tries. In 1989, the European Community and Japan concluded their own semi- 
conductor agreement that set minimum export prices on sales in Europe. The 
European Community remained  suspicious that the market share target dis- 
criminated against European semiconductor producers. In 1992, the European 
Electronic Components Manufacturers Association  demanded their own mar- 
ket share target of 5 percent in Japan.54 
As for the market access provisions of the 1986 agreement, the SIA directed 
attention to the quarter-by-quarter movement in the foreign share of the Japa- 
nese semiconductor market. Foreign producers held 8.5 percent of Japan’s mar- 
ket in the second quarter of  1986, just prior to the agreement, and the share 
54. In setting this target, the association noted that Europe’s estimated world market share out- 
side of  Europe and Japan was roughly 5 percent, while its share in Japan was less than 1 percent. 
European producers believed they had been excluded from trade missions sponsored by  the SIA 
and the EIAJ (see EIecrronic News, December 14, 1992, 23). 53  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
was constant at 8.6 percent in the second half of that year. The SIA deemed 
this as evidence of Japan’s noncompliance. Although this share rose to 9.0 per- 
cent in the first quarter of 1987, this was not known until well after preparations 
had begun for retaliation. 
By early 1987, MITI’s export controls on sales to the United States suc- 
ceeded in preventing dumping, but the SIA renewed its complaints about the 
continuation of third-country dumping and about the lack of movement in its 
market share in Japan. MITI had insufficient power to force Japanese produc- 
ers to purchase foreign chips in the space of a few months but tried to boost 
DRAM prices by  issuing recommendations (administrative guidance) in Feb- 
ruary to reduce output by  10  percent. From MITI’s perspective, such a produc- 
tion cutback would not only assist in enforcing the agreement but would be a 
step toward an antirecession cartel to coordinate production and investment 
decisions for the industry’s benefit. 
At least one merchant producer (Micron) argued that a 10 percent reduction 
was insufficient. But the SIA blasted the move, accusing MITI of trying to 
create “artificial shortages” and increasing government interference in the mar- 
ket.55  This baffling criticism-that  the SIA did not want Japan to sell less, they 
just wanted them to charge a higher price-ignored  the fact that the production 
cuts were a natural outcome of the agreement. As Prestowitz (1988, 166-67) 
observed, requiring the Japanese government to drive up prices in the United 
States and in third markets “amounted to getting the Japanese government to 
force its companies to make a profit and even to impose controls to avoid ex- 
cess production-in  short, a government-led cartel. For the free-traders of the 
United States to be asking Japan to cartelize its industry was the supreme irony. 
Yet  it was logical. . . . It was subsequently criticized for doing so, but it had 
little choice.” 
After having devoted so much time to securing an agreement with Japan, 
the administration was concemed-even  after less than six months of opera- 
tion-that  Japan was not adhering to the agreement: “dumping” continued in 
third countries and market access had not “measurably” improved.56  Fears of 
a loss of credibility with Capitol Hill (if not with Japan), which could trigger 
a backlash  against another “failed” trade agreement with Japan, meant that 
even executive agencies opposed to the agreement felt it necessary to adopt 
strong measures to ensure its implementation. By the end of January 1987, the 
administration  gave Japan 60 days to demonstrate that it was enforcing the 
agreement. On March 19, 1987, the Senate passed by 93-0  a nonbinding reso- 
55. Andrew Procassini, president of the SIA, stated that “rather than requiring Japanese semi- 
conductor producers to price devices at or above cost, as the agreement requires, MITI is trying 
to drive up prices artificially by creating shortages through production controls” (Electronic  News, 
September 14,  1987, 1). 
56. Japanese officials, of course, denied the existence of  third-country dumping. The  Central 
Intelligence Agency lured Japanese sales agents of Oki Electric into DRAM transactions at less 
than FMVs in Hong Kong in March  1987. Invoices were then presented to Japanese negotiators 
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lution, introduced by Senator Pete Wilson (R-Calif.), calling on the administra- 
tion to force compliance  with the trade  agreement, although it fell short of 
explicitly calling for retaliation. By that time the administration had already 
made  preparations  to impose  retaliatory  tariffs. Eight days  later the White 
House announced its intent to retaliate against Japan. 
On April  17, 1987, President Reagan imposed  100 percent tariffs on $300 
million worth of laptop computers, desktop computers, televisions, and power 
tools imported  from Japan. According to administration  calculations,  $135 
million  of  the retaliation was for the injury  suffered by domestic firms from 
continued third-country dumping, and $165 million for lack of progress in in- 
creasing the foreign market share.s7  The sanctions were crafted to hit the ex- 
ports of the principal Japanese semiconductor producers-such  as NEC, Tos- 
hiba, Hitachi, and Matsushita-but  not entail significant consumer losses by 
virtue of  close substitutes (except laptops) from domestic and other foreign 
producers. The retaliation ranks among the most dramatic events of  postwar 
U.S. trade policy. Japan was stunned, but the move played directly into MITI’s 
hands and enhanced its power; indeed, there were reports that some in MITI 
were secretly pleased about the retaliation because it proved to Japanese firms 
that they should follow MITI’s directives. 
The third-country dumping sanctions were gradually eased for diplomatic 
reasons as well as the gradually increasing effect MITI’s controls had on exter- 
nal prices of Japanese semiconductors. In June, $5 1 million in sanctions were 
lifted  before  the annual G-7 summit for partial  compliance with  the  third- 
country dumping provisions. In November, the administration found Japan in 
full compliance and the remaining $84 million in tariffs were removed. The 
$165 million in market access sanctions remained intact until the signing of 
the 1991 semiconductor accord. 
1.7  Toward the 1YY1 Revision 
The US.  retaliation convinced Japanese firms to fall in line and follow M1- 
TI’S directives more closely. By the end of its first year of operation, the semi- 
conductor agreement succeeded in ending Japanese “dumping” in the United 
States and, by and large, in third markets. To adhere to the antidumping terms 
of the agreement, the Japanese government restricted export volume in order 
to meet the price targets, the functional equivalent of a VER. 
As is usually  the case with  other VERs with Japan, the beneficiaries  in- 
cluded Japanese semiconductor firms. The MITI-induced production cutbacks 
provided  a substitute for cooperative industry behavior and raised  the price 
of  DRAMS on sales abroad, generating an enormous  windfall  for Japanese 
producers. According to market analysts reported in Flamm (1989,21), profits 
57. There was much discussion within the administration on the precise dollar amount of retalia- 
tion. The Commerce Department had floated an early figure of $1 billion. 55  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
on 1M DRAM sales for Japanese producers amounted to $1.2 billion in 1988 
alone. As with other VERs, these implicit quota rents could be plowed back 
into  R&D,  capital  spending,  and  product  upgrading.  Japanese  firms  also 
opened new semiconductor fabrication lines in the United States to avoid the 
FMVs. Other foreign beneficiaries included foreign producers not covered by 
the VER, particularly in South Korea where higher worldwide DRAM prices 
accelerated the entry of Samsung, Goldstar, and Hyundai. 
The U.S. semiconductor industry was a partial beneficiary of the antidump- 
ing provisions of the 1986 accord. Even prior to the agreement, Hughes, Len- 
way, and Raybum (1993) found significant positive abnormal stock returns to 
U.S. merchant semiconductor producers on several key announcement dates in 
1986 and 1987. In the DRAM market, the main beneficiaries were limited to 
only two merchant firms-TI  (which was reluctant to initiate any aggressive 
trade policies against Japan) and Micron (which ranked among the smallest of 
U.S. producers). According to market analysts reported in Tyson (1992, 116- 
17), DRAM sales accounted for as much as 60 percent of TI’S profits in 1988, 
and Micron’s sales rose by a factor of six between 1986 and 1988. The employ- 
ment effects of the agreement were probably small: TI and Micron had a total 
DRAM-related  employment  of  approximately  13,000, and  a  back-of-the- 
envelope calculation by Denzau (1988) suggests that for each job retained in 
DRAMs, another was lost in downstream computer manufact~ring.~~ 
For all the concern about the importance of DRAMs, however, there was no 
reentry of U.S. producers into the market in the aftermath of the agreement. In 
August 1986, Motorola agreed to buy prefabricated semiconductor dies from 
Toshiba,  assemble  the  semiconductors  in  Malaysia,  and  ship  them  to the 
United States to avoid the FMVs. In June 1989, several firms-AMD,  Hewlett- 
Packard, DEC, Intel, LSI Logic, and National Semiconductor-contributed 
$50,000 each to finance U.S. Memories, a consortium to establish domestic 
DRAM production. These firms committed  themselves to buy output from 
U.S. Memories equivalent to half of their equity in percentage points (a firm 
owning 5 percent of U.S. Memories, e.g., was obligated to purchase 2.5 per- 
cent of the consortium’s output). Despite even IBM’s support, U.S. Memories 
was stillborn and collapsed in January 1990 owing to insufficient financial sup- 
port and an unwillingness of other major buyers, such as Apple Computer and 
Sun Microsystems, to commit to future purchases. Yet beginning in 1988, the 
industry received extensive financial support ($100 million per year for five 
years) from the Department of Defense for Sematech (SEmiconductor MAnu- 
facturing TECHnology), a industry-led process R&D consortium. 
The clear losers from the semiconductor agreement were the larger and far 
more numerous semiconductor users, particularly computer manufacturers de- 
58. Further back-of-the-envelope calculations by Hufbauer and Elliott (1994, 106-10)  suggest 
increased domestic semiconductor employment of about 2,300 workers, increased producer sur- 
plus of $260 million, increased foreign producer surplus of $835 million, and reduced consumer 
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pendent on DRAMs. Despite numerous complaints among users and even iso- 
lated instances of outright antagonism toward the accord-Tektronix  wanted 
to revoke the agreement completely-opposition  to the 1986 agreement failed 
to crystalize before  1988. As figure 1.1 illustrates, DRAM prices (which usu- 
ally fell sharply after introduction) shot up dramatically in 1988. The price of 
256K DRAMs jumped from about $2.20 at the end of  1986 to $3.50 by  the 
end of  1988-although  long-term  supply  prices  in  Japan  were  largely un- 
changed. The price bubble mainly reflected  a surge in demand for DRAMs 
from another rapid expansion in the computer industry as well as the MITI- 
induced production cutback, which now had affected capacity investment deci- 
sions. 
There were also indications that Japanese producers were cooperating  in 
a de facto market-sharing cartel. Flamm (1993b, 280) notes that “before the 
Semiconductor Trade Arrangement of  1986, episodes of successfully coordi- 
nated restraint on exports or output by  Japanese producers seem to have oc- 
curred only after bureaucrats and politicians responded to trade friction.” But 
even as MITI’s intervention  in  the DRAM  market became less pronounced 
from 1989, DRAM prices in the United States remained substantially above 
estimates of the FMVs. There is evidence that trade restrictions  became,  in 
Krishna’s (1989) term, a “facilitating practice,” that is, facilitated tacit collu- 
sion between Japanese  exporter^.^^ As a result of production controls, Japanese 
firms had to ration output to U.S.  consumers, and this possibly fostered coordi- 
nation  and  collusion. U.S.  firms criticized  Japanese producers  for denying 
them adequate volume of semiconductors and hinted that it was a deliberate 
attempt at retribution. Japanese firms more likely allocated their production to 
firms with whom they had long-standing ties and avoided selling “too much” 
in the United  States.60 No such bubble  appeared  in  the price  of  EPROMs, 
which were also subject to the FMVs. Intel, AMD, TI, National Semiconduc- 
tor, and other U.S. producers never exited the EPROM market, and the much 
lower Japanese share of this market meant their power to produce a substantial 
price rise was much less. 
The price bubble for 256K DRAMs in 1988  proved so costly to semiconduc- 
tor users that it heralded the end of  the SIRS monopoly  position as USTR’s 
adviser on U.S. semiconductor trade policy. Three CEOs of major computer 
systems firms-John  Akers (IBM), James Treybig (Tandem), and John Young 
59. Evidence on Japanese collusion is considered in Tyson (1992) and Flamm (1993b). 
60. As Okimoto (1987, 389-90)  points out, just as purchasers of semiconductors rely on other 
ties besides price, “from the supplier’s standpoint, too, organizational factors can overwhelm nar- 
rowly defined market forces. During periods of economic upturn, for example, when supply fails 
to keep pace with demand, Japanese companies are not inclined to sell on a neutral, first-come, 
first-served basis. Rather, they are apt to allocate limited stocks of  semiconductor components 
according to an implicit hierarchy of customers. Loyal, long-standing customers get priority over 
companies that buy  sporadically on a spot market basis. Vendors and end-users alike operate 
within the framework of long-term, reciprocal relations, which constrain free entry into, and exit 
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(Hewlett-Packard)-formed  the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP) in 
early 1989 as a forum for policy discussions and coordination in this segment 
of the electronics industry. These executives believed that the interests of the 
computer industry were not being met either by the AEA (owing to its size and 
inclusion of semiconductor firms) or the CBEMA (owing to the membership 
of Japanese  firm^).^' The CSPP was designed explicitly to function as a coun- 
terpart to the SIA: it was to facilitate and coordinate the industry’s positions on 
public policy at the CEO level, with only a small staff to manage the activities 
of  individual companies. In May 1989, these three firms invited (at an entry 
fee of  $50,000) other  firms-including  AT&T, Apple  Computer,  Compaq 
Computer, Control Data, Cray Research, DEC, NCR, Prime Computer, Sun 
Microsystems, Tektronix, and Unisys-to  join the CSPP.62  The overarching 
objective of the CSPP was to develop policy recommendations relating to the 
competitive position  of  the computer manufacturers,  although in the invita- 
tional letter to other firms the CSPP founders wrote that “issues relating to the 
U.S .-Japan semiconductor  agreement”  were  the  group’s “first project”  and 
noted that without collective political action the government “may well adopt 
policies counterproductive, and in some cases inimical, to the interests of our 
c~mpanies.”~~ 
Opposition among semiconductor consumers, of course, first materialized in 
the weeks after the initial FMVs had been issued. But this opposition remained 
ineffective for nearly two years because it lacked organization. The CSPP suc- 
ceeded in advancing its agenda for precisely the same reasons the SIA had 
succeeded-CEOs  were  directly involved, sympathetic  political  audiences 
were targeted, and proposals  carried an industry consensus. And the CSPP 
began its organizational life by  directly opposing the SIA on several issues. 
John  Young,  the  CEO of  Hewlett-Packard,  wrote  to  Senator John  Heinz 
(R-Pa.) that the “tone” of a Senate resolution in mid-1989 on Japan’s noncom- 
pliance with the  1986 agreement would “set back rather than advance” the 
interests of computer manufacturers. 
The newly invigorated opposition to the accord was the first of  a series of 
setbacks for the SIA in  1989. The Bush administration’s new USTR, Carla 
Hills, criticized the 20 percent figure in the semiconductor agreement as “man- 
aged trade” and announced a dedication to “process not results” in trade policy. 
Hills later clarified that she would enforce the provisions of the semiconductor 
agreement, but her devotion to the accord was brought into question, and the 
SIA did not view her as an ally. Some in the semiconductor industry argued 
61. As early as July  1988, Tandem argued before the AEA‘s executive board that there was an 
“urgent need” to request “significant modifications” to the 1986 semiconductor agreement to curb 
its “adverse impact” on downstream semiconductor users. This proposal was essentially ignored. 
(See Inside U.S. Trade, August 19, 1988, 13-14,) 
62. The charter members of the CSPP were Apple Computer, Unisys Corporation, Compaq 
Corporation, Cray Research, Hewlett-Packard, LBM,  NCR, Sun Microsystems, and Tandem. At 
the end of  1993, membership also included AT&T, Control Data, Data General, and DEC. 
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that the perception that Hills took the heat off Japan stalled further progress in 
market access, quantitatively measured; the foreign market share stood at 13.6 
percent in the third quarter of  1989 and, after rising slightly, fell back to 13.4 
percent in the first quarter of 1991. 
Other setbacks for the SIA arose when the 20 percent market share target 
appeared beyond reach for the deadline of the end of 199  1. The SIA pressured 
the Bush administration to have Japan cited as a priority country, under the 
new “Super 301” provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, for its failure to abide by the  1986 agreement. The EIAJ declared that 
such a designation would jeopardize cooperation between the two groups and 
threatened to propose Japan’s withdrawal from the agreement. Then the CSPP 
and the CBEMA both directly opposed the SIA’s bid in letters to USTR Hills. 
While  supportive  of  policies  to  promote  greater  market  access,  the  CSPP 
thought  that  a  “priority”  designation  was  “unnecessary  and  unwise”  and 
bluntly stated that the “CSPP does not believe that the Semiconductor Arrange- 
ment  should be extended.” The CBEMA also attacked the notion of  import 
targets, suggesting that an approach focusing specifically on excluded products 
“would be far more productive than continually reiterating the dated approach 
of a 20 percent market share, which was arbitrary at its inception in 1986, and 
remains so today.”@ 
As a result of  this coalition of semiconductor consumers, trade negotiators 
at USTR no longer faced a single voice-the  SIA’s-on  what should deter- 
mine US.  semiconductor trade policy. With the expiration of the accord on the 
horizon, USTR could not possibly negotiate a satisfactory agreement in the 
face of sharply  conflicting  domestic interests. Rather than  mediate between 
the producers and users, USTR instructed the SIA and the CSPP to resolve 
their differences over trade policy  themselves.  Whereas the SIA wanted the 
status quo, the CSPP wanted the agreement scrapped, or at least the antidump- 
ing provision of the agreement that kept U.S. semiconductor prices high. The 
CSPP was basically indifferent toward the market access provision, so long as 
sanction for noncompliance did not impinge on its interests. 
After lengthy negotiations,  the  SIA and the CSPP announced in October 
1990 a joint proposal concerning the shape of a renegotiated agreement. They 
declared the antidumping provisions  of the  1986 agreement a “success” and 
maintained that the Commerce Department should no longer collect costs or 
price data or issue FMVs for DRAMS  and EPROMs. (However, a “fast track” 
for new antidumping complaints would be maintained.) They also agreed that 
“market access results should be measured by quantifiable indicators of prog- 
ress” and that the 20 percent market share should be attained by  the end of 
1992, an extension of one year. 
64. The CBEMA also argued that priority designation was ‘‘inappropriate” because the 1986 
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ductors” (Inside  U.S. Trade, April 20, 1990, 8-10). 59  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry 
The cooperative front formed by the two groups was important to the SIA. 
The joint statement avoided the embarrassment of a larger, downstream high- 
technology  industry  vocally  opposing  renegotiation  of  the  semiconductor 
agreement and was in its tradition of defusing potential opponents. This com- 
promise also eased the burden on USTR of renegotiating the 1986 agreement 
prior to its expiry in mid-1991. Although Japan first denied the need for a new 
agreement, they were soon brought to the bargaining table. With the antidump- 
ing provisions no longer a key issue, the main discussions centered on whether 
the market access provisions should move from the now not-so-secret  side- 
letter into the agreement’s text. Japan resisted but agreed, in exchange for the 
removal  of  the  remaining  $165  million  in  sanctions.  The  final (five-year) 
agreement was reached on June 4, 1991, and the text on this provision read: 
“The Government of Japan recognizes that the U.S. semiconductor industry 
expects that the foreign market share will grow to more than 20 percent of the 
Japanese market by  the end of  1992 and considers that this can be realized, 
The Government of  Japan welcomes the realization of this expectation. The 
two governments agree that the above statements constitute neither a guaran- 
tee, a ceiling, nor a floor on the foreign market share.” 
The comparative ease of the 1991 negotiations demonstrated how institu- 
tionalized the semiconductor agreement had become. Unlike the serious con- 
flicts during the 1986 negotiations, both the United States and Japan had grown 
accustomed to the arrangements by  1991. Cooperative interaction between the 
SIA and the EIAJ and their members had expanded immensely since 1986. 
The Deputy USTR S. Linn Williams flatly stated that the accord was “a much 
more businesslike agreement than its predecessor.” When asked what was dif- 
ferent between the October joint SIA-CSPP proposals and the final agreement, 
Williams remarked, “I would characterize most of these differences as ques- 
tions of technical matters, not policy.” 
In awaiting the end of 1992, the only decision left to the SIA was whether 
to recommend retaliation if the market share target was not reached. In March 
1992, the SIA released a report entitled “Headed towards Crisis” that argued 
that the trade agreement was “at the threshold of failure” and urged “immedi- 
ate and decisive action” by all parties to ensure compliance. Contrary to virtu- 
ally all expectations and propelled by weakness in the Japanese economy, the 
foreign (merchant) market share in Japan reached 20.2 percent in the fourth 
quarter of  1992. How was the market share target achieved? Even prior to the 
1986 agreement, certain (nonintegrated) Japanese firms (such as Sony) pur- 
chased over 20 percent of their semiconductors from U.S. firms. MITI pressure 
on other purchasers (by conducting surveys of the purchasing plans of firms) 
and a greater presence in Japan by U.S. firms probably accounted for the grad- 
ual increase in U.S. market share. Two other hypotheses-that  the composition 
of  Japanese demand shifted toward products the United States was better at 
producing, or US. technological advance in certain rapidly growing product 60  Douglas A. Irwin 
lines, such as Intel’s 486 microprocessors, account for the larger U.S. share- 
are largely unsupported by disaggregated evidence on sales in Japan, according 
to figures presented in Bergsten and Noland (1993, 136). 
How would the SIA react if the 20 percent market share were maintained? 
The  SIA  (1990,  33)  once  argued  that  “after  a  20  percent  level  had  been 
achieved, [the] foreign share would float to an appropriate level based on com- 
petitive merit and without further government targets. . . . [The target was] a 
threshold from which market forces would then take over and operate.” Shortly 
after the 20.2 percent figures was released, a spokesman for TI stated that the 
industry “would be happier with less government involvement” in overseeing 
market  access since they  were becoming  “part  of  the keire~su.”~~  The SIA 
quickly disavowed abandonment of market share targets, however, and some 
industry sources indicated that perhaps the market share target should be in- 
creased. After the market share dropped  to nearly  18 percent  in mid-1993, 
however, USTR Kantor requested  “emergency” consultations with Japan to 
discuss the market access targets.66 
The beginning of  1993 brought the SIA better news when an administration 
sympathetic to high-technology industries and market share targets with Japan 
took office.67  Yet, as keenly illustrated in a virtual repeat of the semiconductor 
trade dispute in 1992-93,  with South Korea as the defendant, the Clinton ad- 
ministration’s embrace of import targets stumbled on the political realities of 
trade policy determination. In April  1992, Micron filed an antidumping peti- 
tion alleging “less than fair value” imports of  1M and higher DRAMS from 
Korea. In October, the Commerce Department announced preliminary dump- 
ing margins (based on petitioner  information) against Samsung (87.40 per- 
cent), Goldstar (52.41 percent), and Hyundai (5.99 percent). Faced with stiff 
antidumping duties, the Korean industry and government proposed in January 
1993 a bilateral  semiconductor trade agreement fashioned on the earlier one 
with Japan. In exchange for a suspension of the antidumping case, the Korean 
industry promised to monitor prices of export sales to the United States. The 
Korean government offered to sign an agreement in which it would commit 
itself to (as a draft stated) “demonstrable and measurable results in terms of 
increasing sales in Korea of  U.S. semiconductors and semiconductor equip- 
ment.” The government also promised to reduce or eliminate the Korean tariff 
65. Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1993, A3. 
66. One MITI official was quoted as saying, “The more the U.S. side overemphasizes this de- 
cline in the market share, the more we are convinced that we will never again negotiate a semicon- 
ductor-type arrangement” (Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1993, A3). 
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on semiconductors, secure greater intellectual property protection of U.S. chip 
designs, and increase U.S. sales through a variety of other means. 
Here was the very prototype of a market-opening import target agreement 
that Clinton administration officials said they coveted with another country to 
which U.S. firms had requested access, yet it was rejected. Confident of resting 
securely behind high antidumping duties imposed against Korea and prospec- 
tively unaffected by the Korean market-opening actions, Micron strongly op- 
posed suspension of the case. The Commerce Department, acting on Micron’s 
wishes, had little authority to pursue the agreement and, absent any pressure 
from the industry, USTR remained inert and basically  ignored the overture. 
By March, the Korean firms provided production cost data to the Commerce 
Department,  and the final antidumping  margins  were drastically cut--0.74 
percent for Samsung, 4.97 percent for Goldstar, and 7.19 percent from Hyun- 
dai. In May, the ITC split 3-3  on the final material injury, with the default 
being that a tie goes to the affirmative and duties will be imposed. Thus, Mi- 
cron squeaked by the ITC but received nowhere near the protection it thought 
it would get by rejecting the Korean proposal, and the Commerce Department 
in representing a “customer-client” firm passed up an opportunity to reduce 
Korea’s semiconductor tariff for all U.S. semiconductor firms.68 
1.8  Conclusions 
Beneath the rhetoric about strategic high-technology industries that pervade 
public policy discussions of  semiconductors, the semiconductor dispute fol- 
lowed the political economy script of  virtually every other instance of U.S.- 
Japan trade friction, from textiles to televisions to automobiles. Japanese firms 
rapidly enter an industry, provide a quality product at a reasonable price, and 
force an insulated U.S. industry to face acute competition. Amid calls for “fair 
trade” and against “dumping,” the domestic industry solicits the government 
for assistance. Foreseeing the inevitability of trade restraints, Japan opts for a 
VER. The VER is adopted by other countries (the European Community) that 
fear a shift in Japanese sales toward their market. The VER generates large 
profits for the now-collusive Japanese producers, often giving them an incen- 
tive to upgrade product quality or move into more profitable lines of produc- 
tion. The restraint provides modest support for remaining  U.S. firms in the 
industry, and an opportunity for producers in other countries to accelerate their 
entry into the market. To avoid the VER, Japanese firms make direct invest- 
ments in the United States, seeking joint ventures with U.S. firms to create a 
web of multinational interests that diminish the anti-Japanese position of U.S. 
firms. Downstream users are harmed by the protection and, if they organize, 
demand offsetting policies or protection for themselves. 
The semiconductor case is unique because of the unprecedented, overreach- 
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ing-and  in some ways outrageous-demands  made by  an industry on US. 
trade policy. The industry wanted an end to what it called “dumping” (implying 
something more than simply a bad demand shock adversely affecting all pro- 
ducers, Japanese included) not just in the United States but in all other markets 
as well. Dumping was never proved to exist in those third markets, and even if 
proved the United States had no authority whatsoever to enforce antidumping 
measures  in  those  countries.  The  antidumping  measures  in  the  1986 
agreement, however, proved not to be politically sustainable in the face of op- 
position from downstream user industries. 
The semiconductor case was also unique in the market share target to com- 
pensate for insufficient market access. On market access, the industry failed to 
identify any governmental import barriers and simply condemned the “struc- 
ture” of the Japanese market as an impediment to its sales there. While denying 
the target was a “guaranteed” market share (and despite many qualifications to 
the target in the official agreements), both the industry and USTR certainly 
acted as though it was. In contrast to antidumping, the SIA succeeded in per- 
petuating the import targets even though the 20 percent figure was reached. 
The question remains: given that the semiconductor industry received all it 
asked for from the government, did the agreement revitalize the industry? Rob- 
ert Baldwin’s notion of the “inefficacy of trade policy” is relevant here. Despite 
the  all-encompassing  dumping  and  market  access  provisions  of  the  1986 
agreement, the  agreement was  actually  quite  narrow  in  scope. While  the 
“affirmative action” market access provisions were generic, the antidumping 
provisions affected only one segment of  the entire semiconductor industry, 
DRAMS, a segment which most U.S. firms had abandoned never to return, 
and to a lesser extent EPROMs. The agreement did not exterminate industry 
recessions: in  1989-91,  industry sales were extremely weak. The agreement 
did not reverse the declining U.S. market share held by  merchant firms: the 
merchant share slipped from about 83 percent in 1986 to 70 percent in 1992, 
although on a worldwide basis the slide in the merchant’s share ended in the 
mid- 1980~~~ 
The semiconductor industry was not myopic in its reluctance to reenter the 
DRAM  market:  not  only  has  South  Korean  and  Taiwanese  competition 
emerged (Samsung recently  overtook Toshiba as the world’s largest DRAM 
producer), but growth in the memory chip market has slowed from almost a 
15 percent annual rate in 1984-88 to about 7 percent in  1988-92.  Meanwhile, 
growth in microdevices (such as microprocessors) has accelerated to over 20 
percent annually from 1988 to 1992.  The market for these semiconductor prod- 
ucts, which embody a greater degree of  intellectual  property  than memory 
chips, is also much more profitable (witness Intel’s success) and much less 
volatile than the market for memory chips. Japan’s success in producing homo- 
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geneous  DRAMS pushed  U.S.  firms into product-differentiated  markets  in 
which they would enjoy greater markups and face less direct competition. 
The semiconductor dispute also yields certain reflections on U.S. trade pol- 
icy institutions. If the U.S. industry’s policy demands were far reaching, so is 
the  extent  to which  certain government  agencies  sought to  accommodated 
those demands. Both the antidumping and the market access issues illustrate 
how trade policy can be driven by a coalition of a few vocal firms, or some- 
times (as was the case in antidumping with Micron) just one firm. Both in the 
1986 and 1991 negotiations with Japan, the bargaining stances taken by USTR 
were precisely the positions held by the SIA and then the SIA and CSPP together. 
These groups had effective veto power over any agreement. In these trade negoti- 
ations, the Commerce Department and USTR-constrained  by the legal proce- 
dures under U.S. trade law-proved  incapable of any independent conception of 
what sorts of policies would best serve the interests of  the economy overall. 
Appendix 
Text of Secret Side-Letter to U.S.  -Japan Semiconductor 
Agreement (1  986) 
By this exchange of letters, we record the following with respect to the Ar- 
rangement  between  the  Government  of  Japan  and  the  Government  of  the 
United States concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products: 
I.  Market Access 
1. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America have met 
on numerous occasions since July 1985. Both Governments are desirous 
of enhancing free trade in semiconductors on the basis of  market pnn- 
ciples and the competitive positions of  their respective  industries. The 
Government  of Japan  welcomes  a significant  increase  in imports  and 
sales of  foreign based semiconductors in the Japanese market through 
free and fair competition. 
2.  The Government of Japan recognizes the U.S. semiconductor industry’s 
expectation that semiconductor sales in Japan of foreign capital-affiliated 
companies will grow to at least slightly above 20 percent of the Japanese 
market in five years. The Government of Japan considers that this can be 
realized and welcomes its realization. The attainment of such an expecta- 
tion  depends  on competitive  factors,  the  sales  efforts  of  the  foreign 
capital-affiliated companies, the purchasing efforts of the semiconductor 
users in Japan and the efforts of both Governments. 64  Douglas A. Irwin 
3. The Government  of  Japan will encourage  Japanese users to purchase 
more foreign-based  semiconductors and to provide further support for 
expanded sales by foreign capital-affiliated semiconductor companies in 
Japan through the establishment of an organization to provide sales assis- 
tance for foreign capital-affiliated semiconductor companies and through 
promotion of long-term relationships between  Japanese semiconductor 
purchasers and foreign capital-affiliated semiconductor companies. 
Source: Inside U.S. Trade 6,  no. 46 (November 18, 1988). 
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Comment  Andrew R. Dick 
Douglas Irwin has constructed a detailed case study of semiconductor trade 
policy starting in the late  1970s, when the industry first received sustained 
attention from policymakers and among trade theorists. His analysis has three 
primary strengths. First, rather than confining attention narrowly to policy out- 
comes, Irwin analyzes how industry characteristics and U.S. trade institutions 
also shaped the negotiating process in market  access and antidumping dis- 
putes. Second, Irwin appropriately emphasizes the semiconductor industry’s 
efforts to build a political consensus both within its ranks and within U.S. 
trade agencies. As he points out, it is incorrect to regard the industry and the 
government as monolithic actors in the semiconductor dispute. Finally, Irwin 
addresses the three questions that George Stigler required in any study of eco- 
nomic regulation:  (1) What  determines  the timing  of  protection? (business 
cycles and import penetration trends), (2) What determines the level of protec- 
tion? (the political costs of and returns to industry lobbying), and (3) What 
determines the form of protection? (the industry’s risk and cost characteristics). 
Irwin’s chronology of the semiconductor trade dispute is comprehensive and 
carefully documented. Accordingly, my comments focus not on the facts of the 
case study but instead on their interpretation and the conclusions that can be 
drawn. First, I believe that the semiconductor industry proved less adept at 
exploiting its political capital than Irwi:.  suggests. Despite its designation as a 
“strategic” industry, its adoption as a focal point in U.S.-Japanese trade negoti- 
ations, and the absence of effective downstream opposition, the industry failed 
to earn a politically sustainable level of administered protection. Second, Irwin 
correctly notes that countervailing pressures limiting semiconductor protection 
came largely from within the industry, rather than from Japanese competitors 
or major semiconductor purchasers. He stresses the opposing pricing objec- 
tives of integrated and nonintegrated semiconductor firms as the primary factor 
limiting industry influence. Another influential factor deserves equal attention, 
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however: the extensive scale of international cross-ownership in semiconduc- 
tor production, which erodes the policy distinction between American and Jap- 
anese firms. Third, while Irwin does not emphasize them, his case study offers 
insights  into  ongoing  policy  debates  over  “rules”  versus  “outcomes” ap- 
proaches to trade negotiations and bilateralism versus multilateralism. 
How Successful Was Semiconductor Lobbying? 
Irwin argues that the “semiconductor industry received all it asked for from 
the government” (section 1.8) and notes that “few industries ever realize the 
sustained, high-level attention needed to result in the negotiation of a govern- 
mental agreement on trade in just one sector” as semiconductor producers re- 
ceived (section 1.1).  The industry’s policy achievements include (1) convincing 
the International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce to levy an- 
tidumping duties on Japanese DRAMS, (2)  persuading the U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative (USTR) to press for greater access to Japanese markets under section 
301, and (3) setting the terms for negotiations in 1986 and 1991 to regulate 
Japanese pricing  and  import practices.  While  these  achievements  proved 
largely unsuccessful in revitalizing the U.S. industry, the consensus view is 
that when the semiconductor industry spoke, US. trade agencies listened. 
While not denying that the semiconductor industry received unprecedented 
and prolonged attention in Washington, I believe that the industry proved to be 
less successful at exploiting its political capital than Irwin (and most other 
researchers) have  concluded. By  this I  do not mean simply that protection 
turned out to be ineffective empirically for the reasons that Robert Baldwin 
(1982) has noted, but rather that the industry failed to earn a politically sustain- 
able level of administered protection. Consider the 1986 agreement, which was 
intended to curb Japanese “dumping” in U.S. and third-country markets.’ Irwin 
notes that even before the agreement was officially signed in November 1986, 
it began to unravel in response to domestic and foreign political pressures. 
Major semiconductor purchasers successfully challenged the Department of 
Commerce’s fair-market-value (FMV) methodology for setting minimum Jap- 
anese import prices. Downstream opposition also forced the agreement’s anti- 
dumping provisions to be dropped when its terms were renegotiated in 1991. 
Furthermore, the agreement’s requirement that Japan regulate its third-country 
pricing proved unenforceable in light of  the intransigence of  the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry and European objections. In sum, the twin 
pillars of  the  agreement’s pricing  provisions-FMV  pricing in  the United 
States and curbing third-country dumping-were  soon undermined by politi- 
cal (rather than purely  economic) forces in  the  United  States, Japan, and 
Europe. 
1. Contrary to the Department of Commerce’s affirmative findings of dumping in its investiga- 
tions of Japanese DRAM and EPROM pricing, there is little economic evidence of below-cost 
sales by Japanese producers. For an analysis of the dumping cases, see Dick (1991). 68  Douglas A. Irwin 
Why Would We  Expect Successful Semiconductor Lobbying? 
Semiconductor firms entered the 1980s with three important political advan- 
tages  that  raised  the  stakes  for both  the  industry  and  U.S.  policymakers. 
Viewed in isolation, these advantages guaranteed that the industry would re- 
ceive unparalleled attention in Washington. 
First, as Irwin notes, events in the semiconductor industry were driven in 
large measure by macro-level rather than industry-level pressures. Japan’s trade 
surplus with the United States was growing steadily, and the trend was particu- 
larly acute in the computer and computer components sectors. The semicon- 
ductor industry seemed to mirror what was “wrong” in general: an industry 
that the United States had dominated in research and sales since its postwar 
inception was struggling to compete against Japanese producers buoyed by 
government subsidies and perceived unfair trade practices. It was in this envi- 
ronment that the semiconductor industry was adopted as the cause cCl2bre for 
those seeking to turn up the pressure on U.S.-Japan trade relations in general. 
Heeding the semiconductor industry’s predictions of its imminent demise was 
the equivalent of drawing a line in the sand for U.S. policymakers. 
Second, semiconductors had been designated a “strategic” industry. The de- 
fense establishment, which had underwritten much of the industry’s basic re- 
search and acted as a major demand source since its infancy, has long regarded 
a secure domestic supply of semiconductors (and semiconductor producers) as 
essential to military preparedness. The strategic trade policy literature, which 
began in the early 1980s and quickly received attention in policy circles, also 
stressed the semiconductor industry’s steep learning curve, large up-front re- 
search investments, short product cycles, and downstream linkages.2  That liter- 
ature has shown how government policies can interact with such strategic in- 
dustry characteristics to allow firms to make credible commitments to preempt 
rivals’ investments. When trade policy acquires a strategic value, the economic 
return to intervention grows and the industry’s potential base of political sup- 
port expands. 
Third, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) was fortunate in that 
semiconductor purchasers mounted only disorganized and ineffective opposi- 
tion. The American Electronics Association (AEA), representing manufactur- 
ers of computer systems and communications equipment, had diverse interests 
and even included several semiconductor producers. While computer manufac- 
turers ultimately split from the AEA to form a splinter lobby group, Irwin notes 
that the SIA retained “its monopoly position  as the USTR’s advisor on semi- 
conductor trade policy” until early 1989. By then, semiconductor trade policy 
had been institutionalized and the debate shifted away from whether to protect 
the industry  and toward  how  to enforce the  agreements  already  negotiated 
with Japan. 
2. A 1984 conference in Washington, D.C., exposed many policymakers to the basic concepts 
of  strategic trade policy and was later published in Krugman (1986). 69  Trade Politics and the Semiconductor  Industry 
Why Did Semiconductor Lobbying Fall Short of Expectations? 
Given these three political advantages, why was the semiconductor industry 
less than completely successful in its lobbying activities? Irwin suggests, and 
I agree, that the SIA’s heterogeneous membership forced it to temper its lob- 
bying objectives. After an initially unsuccessful effort to press its case in Con- 
gress, the SIA was forced to expand its membership from just merchant firms 
(which sold on the open market, and thus favored higher prices) to include also 
vertically integrated firms (which produced largely for internal use, and thus 
sought to avoid price increases). Broadening its membership raised the SINS 
political visibility and potential clout but also forced the association to moder- 
ate its lobbying position. Opposition by integrated firms, for example, forced 
the SIA to abandon plans to file an escape clause petition for import relief or 
to seek antidumping duties under the more lenient section 731 of the Tariff Act 
of  1930. 
Another influence dampening semiconductor lobbying that merits greater 
attention than it receives stems from the extensive scale of international cross- 
ownership in semiconductor production. American and Japanese semiconduc- 
tor firms have extensive cross-ownership in the form of direct equity stakes, 
research joint ventures, technology-licensing agreements, and second-sourcing 
of production. During negotiations leading to the 1986 industry agreement, for 
example, U.S. semiconductor firms had a total of 52 research, technology, and 
production agreements with their Japanese competitors (HaMisch 1986, 57). 
Elsewhere, I have shown how even much lower levels of cross-ownership can 
substantially dampen strategic policy incentives (Dick 1993). Cross-ownership 
not only directly lowers the economic and political return from protection but 
also raises the domestic  industry’s lobbying costs by  introducing heteroge- 
neous interests into the political coalition. In the semiconductor industry, this 
heterogeneity  severely constrained  SIA lobbying. For example, while firms 
without extensive Japanese ties such as Motorola and Micron aggressively lob- 
bied for industry protection, their demands were muted by firms such as Intel 
which  had  numerous  second-sourcing  and  technology-sharing  agreements 
with Japanese competitors (Haklisch 1986; United Nations Center on Transna- 
tional Corporations 1986). 
Drawing Conclusions from the Semiconductor Dispute 
While he does not highlight them, Irwin’s case offers insights into two ongo- 
ing policy debates: “rules” versus “outcomes” and bilateralism versus multilat- 
eralism. The USTR’s adoption of numerical targets for American firms’ Japa- 
nese market penetration mirrors the broader shift away from developing overall 
trading rules or principles  in favor of  mandating  specific market outcomes. 
Setting market share targets gives the appearance of adding flexibility and ob- 
jectivity to dispute resolution. The semiconductor agreements illustrate why 
both appearances are deceptive. When the U.S. share of the Japanese market 
fell modestly below the 20  percent target in late 1993, the USTR reacted by 70  Douglas A. Irwin 
seeking emergency consultations with Japan. The SIA also hardened its posi- 
tion, contending that failure to maintain the arbitrary 20 percent quota placed 
the agreement “at the threshold of failure.” 
Market share targets  ultimately  proved to be unsustainable, however, not 
because of their rigidity  but because they lacked any economic foundation. 
Throughout the trade dispute, the SIA failed to offer persuasive evidence of 
market barriers to its exports. The SIA sought “equal market access,” yet as 
Irwin notes, the US. share of the Japanese semiconductor market actually ex- 
ceeded Japan’s  share of  U.S. chip consumption up until  the mid-1980s and 
remained roughly comparable for a few years later. And while the SIA pointed 
to “unfair  trading practices” to explain  its  stagnant Japanese market  share, 
those practices-vertical  integration, long-term relationships among produc- 
ers, and exclusive distributorships-were  equally commonplace  in the US. 
industry. The SINS success in pressing allegations of market barriers, absent 
empirical evidence, illustrates how an outcomes-based approach is susceptible 
to self-interested industry pressures. 
The semiconductor case study also illustrates the pitfalls of bilateral dispute 
resolution when international markets are highly integrated. The USTR recog- 
nized that any agreement with Japan which merely prohibited dumping in the 
U.S. market would make the United States a high-price island and, by diverting 
Japanese exports to Europe, would reduce American semiconductor exports. 
Instead  of  seeking a multilateral agreement, however, the United States de- 
manded that Japan raise prices in all export markets. Japan’s inability (or un- 
willingness) to curb third-country dumping naturally led to smuggling of chips 
from lower-price Asian markets into the United States. The European Commu- 
nity also objected to being made a silent partner in the US.-Japan Semicon- 
ductor Agreement and ultimately  persuaded a General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade panel that monitoring Japanese export prices on third-country sales 
violated  article XI. To protect its own faltering semiconductor industry, the 
European Community eventually opted for a bilateral trade strategy that mir- 
rored failed U.S. policies: initiating antidumping proceedings against Japanese 
DRAM and EPROM producers and signing a pricing agreement with Japan in 
1989 (Schlesinger 1989). Europe’s bilateral approach proved equally unwork- 
able and spawned secondary trade disputes with the United States. Extensive 
integration in the semiconductor market required a multilateral pricing or pro- 
duction agreement rather than a market-by-market response. 
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